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Free Speech, Terrorism, and
European Security:
Defining and Defending the
Political Community
Shawn Marie Boyne
“[W]e are seeing an increasing use of what I call the „T-word‟—
terrorism—to demonize political opponents, to throttle freedom
of speech and the press, and to delegitimize legitimate political
grievances.”1
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan (2003)
The United States and its European allies are engaged in a
global struggle against terror. While world-wide criticism of
America‘s leadership of the ―war on terror‖ has focused
attention on America‘s human rights transgressions, the
United States is not the only democratic state that, at times,
has privileged national security over civil liberties. Just as
images of the burning World Trade Center towers transformed
America‘s domestic political dynamic and propelled thenPresident Bush to declare a war on terror, subsequent terrorist
attacks in London2 and Madrid3 have raised the stakes, as well
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1. Press Release, Security Council, Menace of Terrorism Requires Global
Response, Says Secretary-General, Stressing Importance of Increased United
Nations Role, U.N. Doc. SC/7639 (Jan. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sgsm8583.doc.htm.
2. See Alan Cowell, Subway and Bus Blasts in London Kill at Least 37,
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2005, at A1.
3. See Elaine Sciolino, 10 Bombs Shatter Trains in Madrid, Killing 192,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004, at A1.
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as the human rights challenges, in Europe.
Without a doubt, both the March 2004 Madrid train
bombings and the July 2005 suicide attacks on the London
transit system noticeably shook European politics and
reshaped Europe‘s counterterrorism policies, albeit in disparate
ways.4 Coupled with the assassination of Dutch filmmaker
Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in November 2004,5 the London
and Madrid bombings strongly impacted European
consciousness and public opinion, stirring public fears that
jihadist networks had penetrated Europe.6 In testimony given
before the United States Senate in June 2007, the Dutch
Deputy National Coordinator for Counterterrorism testified
that ―the greatest threat to the Netherlands‖ was Islamic
radicalism and jihadism.7 In a report released in April 2009,
the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the
Netherlands rated the threat posed to the Netherlands by
terrorism as ―substantial.‖8 In 2007, German Interior Minister
Wolfgang Schäuble stated that ―[t]here are a lot of concrete
indications . . . that show that Germany has increasingly
moved into the crosshairs of international terrorism.‖9 The
4. See Narcisco Michavila, War, Terrorism and Elections: Electoral
Impact of the Islamist Terror Attacks on Madrid 14, 31 (Real Instituto
Elcano,
Working
Paper
No.
13,
2005),
available
at
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/186/Michavila186.pdf
(arguing that the Madrid attacks triggered a backlash against the
government‘s position on the Iraq War). See also First Poll on the London
Bombings, http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/blog/archives/59 (July 9, 2005)
(arguing that public support for government policies that restrict civil
liberties rose after the attack).
5. See Marlise Simons, Dutch Filmmaker, An Islamic Critic, Is Killed,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at A5.
6. See generally Robert S. Leiken, Europe‟s Angry Muslims, 81 FOREIGN
AFF., July-Aug. 2005, at 120.
7. ANDREA NAPHEGYI & ANTONIYA STOYANOVA, NETH. HELSINKI COMM.,
ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 69 (Peter Morris trans., 2007), available at
http://www2.nhc.nl/spaw2/uploads/files/anrep2007.pdf.
8. Letter from the Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding
[National Coordinator for Counterterrorism] to the Chairperson of the Lower
House of the States General (Apr. 6, 2009), available at http://english.nctb.nl/
(search ―Summary DTN 2009‖; follow second search result ―Summary DTN‖
hyperlink). According to the report, this means that there is a reasonable
possibility that an attack will occur against Dutch interests at home or
abroad. Id. at 2. The reasons listed in the report for placing the Netherlands
on the target list is the presence of Dutch military personnel in Afghanistan
as well as the perceived insult to Islam that exists in the Netherlands. Id.
9. Germany
Worried
About
Increased
Terrorism
Threat,
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United States cannot afford to ignore these developments as
recent intelligence reports suggest that terrorist networks in
Europe pose a serious threat, not only to Europe, but to the
United States as well.10
The emergence of this ―new‖ heightened threat prompted
European governments to institute a new round of security
measures. In most cases, however, the ―new‖ counterterrorism
legislation merely revised and extended existing policies.11 As
a result, Europe‘s response to the 2004 and 2005 attacks should
be seen as part of a process that did not start with initial
attacks on European soil, nor with the 9/11 attacks in 2001.
The context and timing of Europe‘s response elucidates another
key point. No ―monolithic‖ European response to terrorism
exists. Instead, Council of Europe member states have adopted
a common framework approach to terrorism that
accommodates differences in states‘ legal and political cultures.
To some extent the current counterterrorism policies in place in
Europe reflect each state‘s unique prior record to responding to
domestic terrorism.12 Despite the fact that European states are
DEUTSCHEWELLE.COM,
July
23,
2007
(F.R.G.),
http://www.dwworld.de/dw/article/0,,2702203,00.html.
10. Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community: Hearing
before the S. Select Comm. on Intel., 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of
Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence), available at
http://intelligence.senate.gov/090212/blair.pdf. See also US Concerned About
Possible Terrorist Threat From Europe, VOANEWS.COM, Jan. 16, 2008,
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-01/2008-01-16voa45.cfm?CFID=259075030&CFTOKEN=98948008&jsessionid=de30bcb440
df9e7f092037467878f2c5b474 (statement by United States Homeland
Security Secretary Michael Chertoff stating that Western Europe could
become a breeding ground for terrorists).
11. See discussion infra Part II(C).
12. In the past four decades, many of Europe‘s largest states acquired
considerable experience confronting the challenge posed by domestic
terrorists. While the United Kingdom leads the list with its nine-decade
battle with the Irish Republican Army, the criminal codes of France (Corsican
nationalists), Spain (Basque Separatists), and Germany (RAF) all carry the
imprimatur of these prior responses to terrorism. The complete list of
international and supranational conventions that relate to terrorism are too
long to include here. The major conventions include: U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1373 of 2001, S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28,
2001); U.N. Security Council Resolution 1624 of 2005, S.C. Res. 1624, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005); the Council Framework Decision on
Combating Terrorism (EU) No. 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002, 2002 O.J. (L
164) 3 [hereinafter Council Framework Decision 2002]; the Council
Framework Decision Amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on
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signatories to international and supranational terrorism
conventions, those conventions have been ―translated‖ into
domestic legal regimes in unique ways.
Faced with a rich vein of research topics concerning the
legality of the United States‘ counterterrorism policies,
American legal scholars have largely ceded critical analysis of
European policies to European scholars and human rights
groups.13 While European government officials have joined
with the media in criticizing human rights violations
committed by the American government in Iraq and
Guantanamo, this chorus of criticism has largely obscured
publicity concerning the potential human rights pitfalls of
Europe‘s own counterterrorism policies.14 To be sure, the broad
scope, reach, and nature of the United States‘ counterterrorism
policy and its decision to invade Iraq have offered critics of
American policy a hefty target. Moreover, because the United
States is a superpower, any misstep provides fodder for critics
who choose to frame their critique as part of a larger discourse
against American hegemony.15 Largely obscured behind the
dark cloud of America‘s perceived human rights transgressions,
and ongoing struggle to exit Iraq, is the extent to which
Combating Terrorism (EU) No. 2008/919/JHA of 28 Nov. 2008, 2008 O.J. (L
330) 21 [hereinafter Council Framework Amendment 2008]; and the Council
of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, May 16, 2005, C.E.T.S.
196.
13. Some notable exceptions, however, exist. See Laura K. Donohue,
Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 233
(2005); Martha Minow, Tolerance in an Age of Terror, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 453 (2007) (assessing the governments‘ simultaneous overreactions and
underreactions to the threats posed by terrorism); Ellen Parker, Comment,
Implementation of the UK Terrorism Act 2006—The Relationship Between
Counterterrorism Law, Free Speech, and the Muslim Community in the
United Kingdom Versus the United States, 21 EMORY INT‘L L. REV. 711 (2007)
(arguing that the United Kingdom has gone further to restrict civil liberties
in the area of free speech).
14. Politicians throughout Europe have criticized U.S. policy regarding
the Iraq War, the treatment of detainees, and the use of torture. See, e.g.,
Raymond Bonner & Jane Perlez, British Report Criticizes U.S. Treatment of
Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2007, at A6; Chirac Questions U.S.-Led
Iraq
War,
BBCNEWS.COM,
Nov.
17,
2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4018325.stm;
German
Chancellor
Criticizes U.S.‟s Guantanamo Facility, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY,
Jan. 7, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1064501.html.
15. See, e.g., Alison Brysk, Human Rights and National Insecurity, in
NATIONAL INSECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DEMOCRACIES DEBATE
COUNTERTERRORISM 1, 7 (Alison Brysk & Gerson Shafir eds., 2007).
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European governments have followed the United States‘ lead in
privileging national security concerns at the expense of civil
liberties.16 In particular, the Council of Europe Convention on
Prevention of Terrorism was the first international instrument
that called for the enactment of penal code provisions
criminalizing the offense of incitement to terrorism.17 The
Convention‘s public provocation offense extends both to direct,
as well as indirect, incitement to terrorism.18
Perhaps nowhere is this development so evident as in the
area of free speech.19 Throughout Europe, states have enacted
anti-incitement and public disorder laws that grant states
broad authority to prohibit and punish speech that may have
highly attenuated links to terrorist activity.20 A key example of
16. One exception to this statement is the widespread criticism of
European complicity in the CIA‘s rendition program. See AMNESTY INT‘L,
STATE OF DENIAL: EUROPE‘S ROLE IN RENDITION AND SECRET DETENTION (2008),
available
at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR01/003/2008/en/2ceda343-41da11dd-81f0-01ab12260738/eur010032008eng.pdf (documenting and criticizing
the participation of several European states in the CIA‘s controversial
rendition program). See also Resolution on the Alleged Use of European
Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of
Prisoners, EUR. PARL. DOC. P6_TA-PROV(2007)0032, ¶ 190 (2007), available
at www.europarl.europa.eu/comparl/tempcom/tdip/final_ep_resolution_en.pdf
(stating that ―all European countries that have not done so should initiate
independent investigations into all stopovers made by civilian aircraft carried
out by the CIA, at least since 2001‖).
17. Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, supra
note 12, at art. 5, ¶ 2. See also ORG. FOR SEC. & COOPERATION IN EUR. ET AL.,
EXPERT WORKSHOP ON PREVENTING TERRORISM: FIGHTING INCITEMENT AND
TERRORIST
RELATED
ACTIVITIES
2
(2006),
available
at
http://www.libforall.org/OSCE%20Preventing%20Terrorism.pdf.
18. Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, supra
note 12, at art. 5, ¶ 1.
19. One exception to this statement is the widespread criticism of
European complicity in the CIA‘s rendition program. See AMNESTY INT‘L,
supra note 16 (documenting and criticizing the participation of several
European states in the CIA‘s controversial rendition program). See also
Resolution on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the
Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, supra note 16.
20. For example, in 2003, Belgium amended its criminal code to include
the crime of incitement. The provision states:
Any person who, either by views expressed in meetings or
public places or by writings, printed matter, images or
emblems of any kind displayed, distributed, sold or put on
sale or public view, directly provoked others to commit the
crime or offence, without prejudice to the penalties imposed
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the erosion of free speech occurring throughout Europe is the
European Court of Human Rights‘s October 2008 decision in
Leroy v. France.21 In that case, the Court upheld the French
conviction of a cartoonist who had penned and published a
cartoon that linked the 9/11 attacks with America‘s decline.22
Leroy, which will be discussed later in this article,23 is just one
example of several cases that demonstrate that legislators and
judges on the other side of the Atlantic have opened the door to
the broad regulation of speech. They have done so by enacting
vaguely-worded legislation that grants prosecutors wide
discretion in applying and enforcing the law. This trend
towards criminalizing broader categories of speech raises the
question as to whether measures taken by democratic
governments to restrict speech in the name of preventing
Islamic radicalization will undermine or strengthen the
European models of democratic governance.
With the change in Administration in Washington, D.C.,
there has, at minimum, been a shift in tone, if not yet in
substance, of American foreign policy.24 Given the close
strategic cooperation between the United States and Europe in
counterterrorism policy, the time is apt for a deeper
examination of the extent to which the anti-terrorism policies
adopted in Europe challenge a foundational principle of liberal

by law on authors of provocations to commit crimes or
offences, even if such provocations were not acted upon.
CODE PÉNAL [Penal Code] art. 66 (Belg.). See also DAVID BANISAR, SPEAKING
OF TERROR: A SURVEY OF THE EFFECTS OF COUNTER-TERRORISM LEGISLATION ON
FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA IN EUROPE 20 (2008), available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/Doc/SpeakingOfTerror_en.pd
f (discussing the Belgian Code in English).
21. Leroy c. France [Leroy v. France], App. No. 36109/03, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2008),
available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=ht
ml&highlight=leroy%20%7C%20v.%20%7C%20france%20%7C%2036109/03&
sessionid=41876423&skin=hudoc-en (upholding Dennis Leroy‘s conviction for
complicity in condoning terrorism).
22. Id.
23. See discussion infra notes 244-55.
24. See,
e.g.,
The
White
House,
Foreign
Policy,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign_policy/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2010)
(stating that the President has ordered the closure of the Guantanamo Prison
and prohibited the use of torture).
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democratic governance—namely, the right to free speech.25 It
is important to acknowledge that the threat posed by terrorism
is not a new challenge for democratic societies and that prior
responses to terrorism crafted by some democratic states have
damaged the rule of law.26 One of the questions that this
article seeks to address is whether the current threat posed by
terrorists in Europe represents a categorically new type of
security threat that may justify more serious intrusions on civil
liberties: in the province of free speech, does the danger posed
by calls to violent jihad by Islamic extremists within Europe
represent such a serious threat to European security that
justifies restrictions on speech?
On a cursory level, the fact that anti-terrorism legislation
in Europe threatens to infringe on free speech is not surprising.
In contrast to Europe, the United States‘ free speech
jurisprudence is the most robust in the world.27 During the
past forty years, Supreme Court decisions have widened the
ambit of free speech protections and elevated the level of
protection afforded to political speech.28 Critically, the state
cannot restrict free speech on the basis of content unless the
25. See generally Marin R. Scordato & Paula A. Monopoli, Free Speech
Rationales After September 11th: The First Amendment in Post-World Trade
Center America, 13 STAN. L. & POL‘Y REV. 185 (2002) (discussing how
counterterrorism legislation in the United States infringes on free speech).
26. See, e.g., Shawn Boyne, Law, Terrorism, and Social Movements: The
Tension Between Politics and Security in Germany‟s Anti-Terrorism
Legislation, 12 CARDOZO J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 41 (2004). See also generally
David R. Lowry, Draconian Powers: The New British Approach to Pretrial
Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 8 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV., Fall-Winter
1976-1977, at 185 (discussing the problems in guerilla warfare and urban
terrorism that challenge law enforcement in democratic states); Lynn
Wartchow, Civil and Human Rights Violations in Northern Ireland: Effects
and Shortcomings of the Good Friday Agreement in Guaranteeing Protections,
3 NW. U. J. INT‘L HUM. RTS. 1 (2005) (arguing that Northern Ireland‘s political
structure perpetuated a structure that tolerated the state‘s human rights
abuses).
27. See, e.g., The Tongue Twisters, ECONOMIST (London), Oct. 13, 2007, at
80.
28. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (upholding flag
burning as a means of political protest despite potential offensiveness);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that an individual cannot be
criminally punished for wearing an offensive article of clothing that criticized
the draft); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the
state may not regulate expression that advocates the use of force or the
violation of law unless the advocacy ―is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action‖).
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government regulation clears the rigorous strict scrutiny
standard.29 Attempts to restrict the content of core protected
speech must be narrowly tailored to serve a ―compelling state
interest.‖30 The stringent protections afforded to free speech in
the United States stem from the ―preferred position‖ that free
speech enjoys among individual rights in the United States
Constitution.31 According to the liberal vision of the state, the
government‘s role is to protect individual rights by keeping the
public sphere relatively free of government regulation.32 As
Adrian Oldfield has written:
The function of the political realm is to
render service to individual interests and
purposes, to protect citizens in the exercise of
their rights, and to leave them unhindered in the
pursuit of whatever individual and collective
interests and purposes they might have.
Political arrangements are thus seen in
utilitarian terms. To the extent that they afford
the required protection for citizens and groups to
exercise their rights and pursue their purposes,
then citizens have little to do politically beyond
choose who their leaders are to be.33
In contrast, the European Convention on Human Rights
(―ECHR‖), which sets the broad framework for human rights
protections in Europe, tempers the protection afforded to free
29. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,
655 (1990); Sable Commc‘ns, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Bd. of
Airport Comm‘rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 572-73 (1987);
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985);
Perry Educ. Ass‘n v. Perry Local Educators‘ Ass‘n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983);
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
30. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring
and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2417 (1996). See
also, e.g., supra note 29 and cases cited therein.
31. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946).
32. See, e.g., Ruti Teitel, Militating Democracy: Comparative
Constitutional Perspectives, 29 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 49, 52 (2007) (discussing
different free speech regimes in the United States and in Europe).
33. Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism
and the Modern World, in THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATES 75, 76 (Gershon Shamir
ed., 1998).
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speech with the governmental necessity of imposing
restrictions ―in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, [or] for the prevention of disorder or
crime.‖34 This approach privileges the state‘s interests in
preserving order and protects communitarian values such as
preventing social unrest and promoting inclusiveness.35 These
broad differences between the orientation of individual and
collective rights in Europe and the United States have been
well-documented.36 What is surprising is the extent to which
Europe‘s leading democratic states have significantly
circumscribed the right to free expression as part of a broader
counterterrorism strategy.37
While scholars have extensively documented the tension
that exists between national security and civil liberties, this
article focuses specifically on penal code provisions designed to
target individuals who encourage others to commit terrorist
acts by inciting or glorifying terrorism. Section I lays out the
nature of the threat that radical speech poses to democratic
states as well as the difficulties inherent in crafting legislation
that does not over-broadly target radical speech. Section II
outlines the efforts taken at the European Community and
Member State levels to criminalize speech that glorifies or
tends to incite terrorism. I demonstrate that the prominent
role that the concept of human dignity plays in European
jurisprudence at both the supranational and national levels
34. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 10, ¶ 2, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5. Article 10 broadly
protects free speech and defines it as the right to ―hold opinions and to
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers.‖ Id. art. 10, ¶ 1. This right is tempered
by the fact that the ECHR grants member states the power to impose
restrictions that ―are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, [or] for the prevention
of disorder or crime.‖ Id. art. 10, ¶ 2. In addition, Article 17 of the ECHR
denies citizens the ―right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed
at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.‖ Id. art.
17.
35. Teitel, supra note 32, at 52.
36. See, e.g., Jochen Abr. Frowein, Incitement Against Democracy as a
Limitation of Free Speech, in FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND INCITEMENT AGAINST
DEMOCRACY 33, 34-38 (David Kretzmer & Francine Kershman Hazan eds.,
2000).
37. See generally BANISAR, supra note 20 (detailing a broad range of new
restrictions on the media).
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helps to explain the ease with which European states have so
quickly moved to restrict speech to counter perceived terrorist
threats. I argue that a key reason why some European states
are moving closer to over-regulating free speech is that the
political culture has never endorsed an absolutist vision of free
speech. Section III draws on case decisions to prove my thesis.
Moreover, I suggest that legislation that has been designed to
curb radicalization by curtailing speech expands prosecutorial
discretion to a degree that is unwarranted by the legislation‘s
efficacy in fighting terrorism. Section IV concludes this article
by asking whether or not the law is the appropriate tool to
disrupt the radicalization process that drives individuals to join
the Islamic jihad and suggesting directions for future
scholarship.
There is extensive literature regarding the threat to free
speech rights posed by the Government‘s response to terrorism
in the United States.38 Unsurprisingly, the literature that
addresses the right to free speech often ignores developments
on the European continent. Examining the free speech policies
of European states can provide insights into the benefits and
disadvantages that alternative approaches to regulating free
speech may offer governments as they confront the dangers
posed by Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. Moreover, this
article aims to contribute to the common interest that the
United States and Europe share in preserving the rule of law
and in curbing the state‘s ability to implement law in a
discriminatory manner.
By exploring the responses to
terrorism taken by European states, it is possible to revisit the
advantages and disadvantages of our own policies and
illuminate our understanding of the forces that drive terrorism
policy.
I. When Speech Threatens: Looking at Terrorism-Related
Speech in Europe
Europe today faces an ongoing and active threat from
terrorist groups that perhaps exceeds the threat faced by the
38. See generally, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE
SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON
TERRORISM (2004); Donohue, supra note 13; Eugene Volokh, Deterring Speech:
When is it ―McCarthyism‖? When is it Proper?, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1413 (2005).
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United States.39 In 2008, 515 terrorist attacks were carried out
in European Union member states.40 During that same period,
law enforcement officers arrested over one thousand
individuals for terrorism-related activities.41 According to the
European Police Agency (EUROPOL), law enforcement charged
the bulk of the individuals arrested with the offense of
suspicion of membership in a terrorist organization.42 The
remainder of the arrests included attack-related offenses,
fomenting propaganda, and providing support to terrorists.43
Despite the publicity given to al-Qaeda in the United States,
the bulk of these attacks were committed by non-Islamic
separatist groups in France and Spain.44 However, only one
attack in 2008, in which a United Kingdom national detonated
a bomb in England, can be attributed to Islamic terrorism.45
This dearth of attacks by Islamic extremists does not mean
that intelligence experts should remove Europe from the list of
states targeted by Islamic extremists. The fact that European
officials have arrested scores of individuals on charges related
to planning actions undertaken in Belgium, France, Spain, and
other countries demonstrates that Europe still faces an active
threat.46
There are myriad reasons why radical Islamic terrorist
groups have targeted Europe. A key cause has been the
emergence of home-grown terrorist cells within Europe. While
39. Anil Dawar, Barack Obama Warns Europe Faces Greater Threat
From
al-Qaeda,
GUARDIAN.CO.UK,
Apr.
3,
2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/03/obama-russia-nato-al-qaida
(stating that President Obama believes that it is more likely that al-Qaeda
could launch a serious terrorist attack in Europe than in the United States).
40. EUROPOL, TE-SAT 2009: EU TERRORISM SITUATION AND TREND
REPORT
§
4.1
(2009),
available
at
http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_Terrorism_Situation_and_Tre
nd_Report_TE-SAT/TESAT2009.pdf.
41. Id. § 4.2. Approximately fifty percent (501 out of 1009) of the
suspects arrested were associated with a separatist organization.
Government officials identified 187 individuals as linked to Islamist
extremism. The remainder of the arrestees fell into the categories of left
wing extremism, single issue extremism, or unspecified causes. Id.
42. Id. § 4.3.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 4.1 (explaining that there were 137 attacks committed in
France and 253 committed in Spain).
45. Id. § 5.
46. Id.
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al-Qaeda posed an external threat to Europe at the time of the
9/11 attacks,47 ―proselytizing . . . by radical preachers‖ within
Europe has fuelled the emergence of home-grown groups
capable of carrying out attacks on European soil.48 Although it
has become convenient to designate al-Qaeda as the prime
suspect whenever a terrorist attack occurs, al-Qaeda is not a
vast monolithic organization. Instead, it is a brand name used
by a loosely connected network of groups that subscribe to the
ideology of jihadism.49
Radical preachers, who propagate the doctrine of radical
Salafist Islam, play a key role in spreading the message of
jihad.50 The preachers and the message they espouse pose a
critical threat to Europe‘s democratic governments. With the
financial support of the Saudi government, there has been an
unprecedented increase in the number of Wahhabi/neo-Salifi
mosques built in Western Europe and the United States in the
last three decades.51 This support has transformed a religion
with primarily local support to a doctrine with global reach.
This reach expanded significantly when Saudi Arabia elected to
support American policy during the first Gulf War by allowing

47. While several of the participants in the 9/11 attacks resided in
Hamburg, Germany prior to the attacks, they were not citizens of any
European country.
See TERRY MCDERMOTT, PERFECT SOLDIERS: THE
HIJACKERS: WHO THEY WERE, WHY THEY DID IT, at xi-xii (2005).
48. Juan José Escobar Stemmann, Middle East Salafism‟s Influence and
the Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe, MID. E. REV. INT‘L AFF.,
Sept.
2006,
at
1,
1,
available
at
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue3/Escobar.pdf.
49. See JASON BURKE, AL-QAEDA: CASTING A SHADOW OF TERROR 16-17
(2003).
50. The followers of radical or neo-Salafism Islam are an offshoot of the
Salafi movement. That movement rejects ―modern‖ interpretations of Islamic
texts and interprets ―modern‖ to mean any text not authored by scholars who
were part of the first two generations of scholars who immediately followed
the prophet Mohammed. See Escobar Stemmann, supra note 48, at 1. As
fundamentalist believers, adherents of this strain of Islam reject more
contemporary interpretations of the Koran. See Benjamin E. Schwartz,
America‟s Struggle Against the Wahhabi/Neo-Salafi Movement, 51 ORBIS 107,
112-13 (2007). More specifically, proponents of Salafism desire to practice
Islam exactly as it was revealed by the Prophet and they reject subsequent
interpretations of Islam authored by Islamic jurists. See Lee Smith, Jihad
Without End, SLATE.COM, Mar. 18, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2097370.
51. See Schwartz, supra note 50, at 113. Motivating the Saudi actions
was a desire to counter the ideological vision advanced by Iran‘s Islamic
revolution and new theocratic government beginning in 1979. Id. at 114.
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American troops to be stationed on Saudi soil. This decision
fueled the more extremist Salafi scholars to prosteletize a more
politicized theology52 that questioned the legitimacy of the
Saudi government and called for a jihad.53 Ironically, while
Saudi Arabia‘s efforts to spread Wahhabism hampered the
spread of Iran‘s influence, the institutional network created to
foster that spread was susceptible to cooptation by more
extremist elements.
Although moderate followers of Salafism recognize the
authority of the Saudi clergy and royal family, radical Salafists
propagate a clear, theological vision of Islam that aims to
impose a global Islamic caliphate.54 Accordingly, radical Salafi
preachers do not acknowledge the authority of secular political
figures, nor do they accept the concept of a nation-state.55
Their goal of a supranational political religious community
casts a hostile eye on Europe‘s political and intellectual
pluralism.56 Because this theocratic political doctrine views the
concept of political and intellectual pluralism with hostility, it
challenges Europe‘s multi-cultural goal of promoting religious
tolerance. Indeed, the doctrine of Salafi jihad promoted by
radical Salafists aims to counter Europe itself and to establish
an Islamic state governed by Sharia law.57
In this religious ―war,‖ radical imams function as front line
officers. This strategy was echoed by Dr. al-Qaradawi on the
Arabic radio station, al-Jazeera: ―Islam will return to Europe.
The conquest need not necessarily be by sword. Perhaps we
will conquer these lands without armies. We want an army of
preachers and teachers who will present Islam in all languages

52. See id. at 116 (stating that the United States‘ actions to defend Saudi
Arabia and Saudi Arabia‘s rejection of al-Qaeda‘s offer of assistance made the
United States an al-Qaeda target).
53. See Escobar Stemmann, supra note 48, at 3. Abu Muhammad alMaqdisi published a book in 1991 entitled Proof of the Infidelity of the Saudi
State. According to Escobar Stemmann, Abdallah Azzam‘s treatise, entitled
The Main Obligation of Muslims is to Defend the Land of Islam, has helped to
shape Usama bin Laden‘s views. Id. at 4.
54. See Schwartz, supra note 50, at 111-15.
55. See Escobar Stemmann, supra note 48, at 3.
56. Id.
57. See Shmuel Bar, The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism: What
the Fatwas Say, POL‘Y REV., June-July 2004, at 27, 29-30. See also Schwartz,
supra note 50, at 111.
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and all dialects.‖58
During the past decade, the presence of this army of
preachers and teachers on European soil has facilitated the
spread of the radical jihadist message to disaffected Muslims
within Europe. Although not all mosques in Europe have been
co-opted by the message of radical Salafism, estimates of the
degree of ―penetration‖ are discouraging. A 2007 study by the
London Times found that almost half of Britain‘s 1,350
mosques are under the control of a hard-line sect whose leading
preacher ―has called on Muslims to ‗shed blood‘ for Allah.‖59
Given that the ideology of jihad has spread into mosques,
prisons, and social networks throughout Europe, the
appearance of home-grown terrorists in Europe is
unsurprising. In fact, by 2002, the Danish intelligence service
reported that radical Muslims who had been born and raised in
Europe ―were beginning to regard Europe as a frontline for
Jihad.‖60 By 2003, that same intelligence agency noted that
grassroots radicalization was gaining ground in Europe.61 The
problem has only worsened. In the two-year span between
2002 and 2004, intelligence agencies throughout Europe began
to shift their focus away from the external threat represented
by al-Qaeda to the potential threat posed by home-grown
terrorists.62
58. Kristin Baker, James Mitchell, & Brian Tindall, Combating Islamist
Terrorism
in
Europe,
AM.
DIPLOMACY,
Nov.
13,
2007,
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2007/1012/bake/bakeretal_islameuro
pe.html (citing Anthony Browne, The Triumph of the East, SPECTATOR.CO.UK,
July 24, 2004, http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/12424/the-triumph-ofthe-east.thtml (quoting imam Dr. Al-Quaradawi, Sharia and Life (al-Jazeera
television broadcast 1999), translated by the Middle East Media Research
Institute)).
59. Melanie Phillips, Denial, England: Have We Learned Nothing?,
NAT‘L
REV.
ONLINE,
Sept.
11,
2007,
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=M2I4ZTIzNGY1ZjkzYjU4ZjU5NjA3NTQ
4MjBlNTk3NWQ=.
60. TOMAS PRECHT, DANISH MINTR‘Y OF JUST., HOME GROWN TERRORISM
AND ISLAMIST RADICALISATION IN EUROPE: FROM CONVERSION TO TERRORISM 18
(2007),
available
at
http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/fileadmin/downloads/Forskning_og_dokume
ntation/Home_grown_terrorism_and_Islamist_radicalisation_in_Europe__an_assessment_of_influencing_factors__2_.pdf.
61. Id.
62. In 2004, the British Joint Intelligence Committee reported that the
United Kingdom would face an ongoing threat from domestic terrorism over
the next five years. See id. Germany‘s Ministry of the Interior published a
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At its core, the battle being waged by radical Islamists is
not merely an attempt to challenge Europe‘s secular
governments, but is also an effort by the Wahhabi/neo-Salafi
movement to impose its political vision on all followers of
Islam.63 To this end, jihadist organizers aim to expand the
reach of the radical Salafist message throughout Europe. In
2005, writing in Foreign Affairs, Robert S. Leiken noted:
Jihadist networks span Europe from Poland
to Portugal, thanks to the spread of radical Islam
among the descendants of guest workers once
recruited to shore up Europe‘s postwar economic
miracle. In smoky coffeehouses in Rotterdam
and Copenhagen, makeshift prayer halls in
Hamburg and Brussels, Islamic bookstalls in
Birmingham and ―Londonistan,‖ and the prisons
of Madrid, Milan, and Marseilles, immigrants or
their descendants are volunteering for jihad
against the West.64
To explain why the message of radical Islam has taken
root in Europe, some scholars point to underlying societal
tensions that have been several decades long in development.65
Despite the fact that European governments and businesses
opened the door to an influx of guest workers after World War
II, many European citizens viewed those invitations as
temporary in nature.66
Although many first-generation
Muslim immigrants have long since satisfied formalistic
criteria for earning European citizenship, in the eyes of those
Europeans who do not embrace the vision of a multi-cultural
report in 2004 that estimated that there were 31,800 ―members and
followers‖ of Islamist organizations and 57,000 ―potentially extremist
foreigners in Germany.‖ See Kathleen Ridolfo, Europe: Growing Base for AlQaeda?,
TERRORISME.NET,
July
7,
2005,
http://www.terrorisme.net/p/article_164.shtml (internal citation omitted).
63. See generally Leiken, supra note 6.
64. Id. at 124 (arguing that the Wahhabi/neo-Salafi movement aims to
impose its political vision on all followers of Islam including traditional
Sunnis, Shiites, secular Kurds, and all other followers).
65. Jocelyne Cesari, Islam, Secularism and Multiculturalism After 9/11:
A Transatlantic Comparison, in EUROPEAN MUSLIMS AND THE SECULAR STATE
39, 43-44 (Jocelyne Cesari & Seán McLoughlin eds., 2005).
66. Leiken, supra note 6, at 121-22.
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Europe, Muslims have not—and perhaps cannot—satisfy
unstated cultural criteria. As a result, for many Muslims
living in Europe today, citizenship is a hollow shell that does
not extend to social, cultural, and political realms. Although
Muslim leaders in Europe have become increasingly engaged
with the State and civil society, many European citizens
continue to view Muslim claims for public recognition as
threats to European culture and society.67
Thus, in addition to their deep-seated religious faith,
Europe‘s home-grown terrorists share a sense of alienation
from European society as well as a hatred of Western culture.68
In large part, this alienation can be tied to the stagnant social
and economic position and high unemployment of many
Muslim immigrants.69 Many remain trapped in menial jobs
with little chance of advancement.70 In contrast to the United
States where Muslim immigrants have largely integrated
themselves within America‘s diverse society, many second and
third generation Muslim ―immigrants‖ in Europe reside in
largely poor, separate geographic communities that are
ethnically and religiously homogeneous.71 These separate
communities are a natural recruitment ground for radical
Islamists.72
There is yet an additional political component to the
radicalization problem. Many Europeans have come to reject
the multi-cultural vision advanced by elite-level policymakers.73
Throughout Europe, attitudes towards Muslim
citizens hardened after the 9/11 attacks.74 Some opinion
67. Jocelyne Cesari, Introduction, in EUROPEAN MUSLIMS AND THE
SECULAR STATE, supra note 65, at 1, 4.
68. PRECHT, supra note 60, at 9.
69. Id. at 44.
70. Id.; David Rieff, An Islamic Alienation, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 14,
2005, at 11, 11.
71. See Posting of Perrspective, Homegrown Terrorism in the U.S. and
Europe, http://www.perrspectives.com/blog/archives/000451.htm (Aug. 13,
2006, 12:40 EST).
72. Leiken, supra note 6, at 123.
73. Id. at 123.
74. See, e.g., Olof Åslund & Dan-Olof Rooth, Shifts in Attitudes and
Labor Market Discrimination: Swedish Experiences After 9-11, 18 J.
POPULATION ECON. 603, 605-07 (2005) (suggesting that Swedish attitudes
towards immigrants may have created a lasting shift in negative attitudes
towards immigrants).
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leaders have felt increasingly less constrained in promoting
platforms that would curtail immigration.75
Although these socio-political factors help to create
favorable conditions that may spur some disaffected
individuals to turn to violence, there is no single path to
Unfortunately, many
becoming a violent extremist.76
democratic states have constructed anti-radicalization policies
based on the premise that such a singular path exists. Many
states‘ counterterrorism policies are based on the premise that
the path to becoming a terrorist begins with the individual‘s
embrace of conservative Salafi interpretations of the Koran.77
Accordingly, governments such as the United Kingdom have
implemented policies that aim to suppress the spread of the
conservative Salafi message.78 While some members of the
counterterrorism community celebrate this proactive approach,
there are significant problems with these ―counterradicalization‖ programs. As Dr. Jeffrey Stevenson Murer
points out:
One of the most significant problems with
most of the European ‗counter-radicalisation‘
programmes,
.
.
.
is
the
frequent
conceptualisation of radicalisation as a singular
position, within a singular community, leading
toward a singular trajectory. Explicitly this
translates as a road toward ‗terrorist violence‘,
which begins with the adoption of conservative
Salafi interpretations of the Koran within the—
again singularly conceived—Muslim community,
which may lead to involvement in suicide
bombings.79

75. See Terri E. Givens, Immigrant Integration in Europe: Empirical
Research, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 67, 68, 75-76 (2007).
76. Jeffrey Stevenson Murer, Radical Citizenship, 19 PUB. SERVICE REV.:
HOME AFF. 42, 42 (2009) (internal citation omitted).
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., U.K. to Shift Anti-Terror Strategy, BBCNEWS.COM, Feb. 16,
2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7889631.stm (stating that the
United Kingdom would now target violent extremists who voice disapproval
of democracy and state institutions).
79. See Stevenson Murer, supra note 76, at 42.
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If it is true that individuals become radicalized in a variety
of ways, counterterrorism strategies premised on a singular
path to radicalization rest on faulty empirical assumptions.80 If
radicalization is indeed a dynamic process that includes both
individual-specific and macro-level factors, then governments
that prosecute radical speech risk implementing overbroad
prohibitions that will undermine democratic debate without
seriously disrupting the radicalization process.81 This fact
creates a problem for policy-makers. As evidence suggests that
the radicalization process is occurring more widely and
anonymously in the internet age,82 it has become more difficult
to target groups of individuals participating in that process.
Although radical mosques have played a key role in
recruitment efforts in the past, that role is now declining as
Islamic recruitment efforts have been driven underground.83
Moreover, despite the abundance of scholarship and conjecture
that points to religious doctrine as being the wellspring of
inspiration for terrorist violence in Europe today, a 2009 study
published by the United Kingdom‘s counter-intelligence and
national security agency, MI5, discovered that individuals who
are more likely to engage in violence are typically not religious
zealots.84
An
additional
consideration
that
complicates
counterterrorism policy is the fact that mere exposure to
extremist ideology will not, by itself, lead an individual to
adopt radical beliefs. In fact, data collected from hundreds of
case studies demonstrates that ―no one becom[es] a terrorist

80. In this context, I have adopted Precht‘s definition of radicalization,
which defines it as ―a process of adopting an extremist belief system and the
willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence and fear, as a method of
effecting changes in society.‖ PRECHT, supra note 60, at 16.
81. See Edwin Bakker, Jihadi Terrorists in Europe and Global Salafi
Jihadis, in JIHADI TERRORISM AND THE RADICALISATION CHALLENGE IN EUROPE
69, 79-84 (Rik Coolsaet ed., 2008); PRECHT, supra note 60, at 32-44, 79-81;
MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, N.Y. CITY POLICE DEP‘T, INTELLIGENCE
DIV., RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 19 (2007),
available
at
http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_ReportRadicalization_in_the_West.pdf.
82. PRECHT, supra note 60, at 6.
83. EUROPOL, supra note 40, at 19.
84. See Stevenson Murer, supra note 76, at 42.
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overnight.‖85 Individuals must come in personal contact with
other individuals who are members of violent extremist
networks.86 Indeed a 2008 report released by MI5 goes further,
stating that ―[w]hat is different about those who ended up
involved in terrorism is that they came into contact with
existing extremists who recognised their vulnerabilities (and
their usefulness to the extremist group).‖87 Once an individual
joins a group, psychological factors such as the reward of
belonging, enhanced self-esteem, and a sense of security bind
the individual to the group.88 While online extremist website
communities do not, by themselves, radicalize individuals, they
create opportunities for ―virtual‖ social interaction that may
precede or supplement benefits received from person-to-person
contact.89
Although this research argues in favor of law enforcement
policies that target recruitment networks, to an increasing
extent, ―terrorist‖ activity in Europe is taking place outside
known terrorist networks. According to a 2008 EUROPOL
report, law enforcement authorities could not link over twothirds of the individuals arrested in Europe on suspicion of
involvement in Islamic terrorism to affiliations with known
terrorist groups.90 The elusiveness of terrorist groups in
Europe has frustrated law enforcement. While it may be
difficult to identify and track down terrorist cells, it is easy to
enact legislation that criminalizes speech that may ―incite‖
terrorism.
Unfortunately, the research discussed above
suggests that that it is unlikely that such legislation will play
an effective role in deterring terrorism. Instead, since many
individuals who listen to ―radicalized‖ messages do not become
terrorists, legislation that solely targets the messages will overbroadly curtail speech. Not only will some of the speech that
this legislation targets never lead individuals to join terrorist
85. Alan Travis, The Making of an Extremist, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Aug. 20,
2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 81, at 20, 37. See also Todd C. Helmus,
Why and How Some People Become Terrorists, in SOCIAL SCIENCE FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM: PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER 71, 79-81 (Paul K. Davis
& Kim Cragin eds., 2009).
90. EUROPOL, supra note 40, at 19.
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groups, but the legislation will also catch some individuals in
its net who never intended to even indirectly incite violence.
While the grave nature of the threat that radical Islamic
terrorism poses to Europe may explain European lawmakers‘
motivations in criminalizing a broader range of speech, it does
not explain why such regulations are considered
constitutionally permissible.
Section II sets forth the
constitutional framework that protects the right to free speech
in Europe. I then show why courts in most cases have
condoned efforts that have been taken at the European
Community and Member State levels to criminalize incitementrelated speech.
II. Targeting Speech in a Time of Terror: Europe‘s
Constitutional & Legislative Framework
A. European Convention on Human Rights
The right to free speech is a fundamental right common to
democratic societies. Although liberal democracies differ in the
degree of protection that they grant free speech, the right of
citizens to criticize their own government is an indispensable
pillar of free societies that distinguishes them from
authoritarian regimes. When the degree of constitutional
protection accorded to free speech in the United States and
Europe is examined, however, it is apparent that the sociopolitical construction of ―free speech‖ doctrine differs
dramatically.91 The primary point of divergence is that many
post-war European constitutions, as well as European
Community instruments, have accorded the concept of human
dignity prominent constitutional status.92
The profound
devastation caused by World War II crippled the continent and
hardened the continent‘s post-war commitment to preserving
norms of democratic governance.93 In countries such as
Germany, an essential pillar of that commitment is the
doctrine of ―militant democracy,‖ which grants governments
91. Georg Nolte, European and US Constitutionalism: Comparing
Essential Elements, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM 3, 9 (Georg
Nolte ed., 2005).
92. Id.
93. See id.
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the affirmative power to sanction speech aimed at
overthrowing the democratic order.94 In stark contrast to the
high value placed on individual liberty in the United States,
European courts in general place a high value on human
dignity and grant the state the power to curtail speech that
harms the dignity of individuals and groups within society.95
European history has played a crucial constitutive role in
shaping the constitutional enshrinement of the principle of
human dignity. Not only is the principle known as the
―watermark‖ of the ECHR,96 but it is explicitly recognized in
the constitutions of Austria,97 Belgium,98 Germany,99
Finland,100 Estonia,101 Greece,102 Hungary,103 Ireland,104
Italy,105 Latvia,106 Lithuania,107 Poland,108 Portugal,109
Slovenia,110 the Slovak Republic,111 and Spain.112 Moreover,
decisions of the European Court of Justice underscore the fact

94. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Comparative Perspective on the
First Amendment: Free Speech, Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of
Dignity as a Preferred Constitutional Value in Germany, 78 TUL. L. REV.
1549, 1558 (2004).
95. See John C. Knechtle, Holocaust Denial and the Concept of Dignity in
the European Union, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 41, 58 (2008).
96. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 1, Dec.
18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 10 (―Human dignity is inviolable. It must be
respected and protected.‖).
97. BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [Constitution], art. 4 (Austria).
98. BELG. CONST. art. 23.
99. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG]
[Constitution] art. 1 (F.R.G.).
100. SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI [Constitution] arts. 1, 7, 19 (Fin.).
101. EST. CONST. art. 10.
102. 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN] [Constitution] arts. 7, 106 (Greece).
103. A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA [Constitution] art. 54 (Hung.).
104. Ir.
CONST.
[Constitution],
1937,
pmbl.,
available
at
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/attached_files/Pdf%20files/Constitution%20of%20
Ireland.pdf.
105. CONSTITUZIONE [Cost.] [Constitution] arts. 3, 41 (Italy).
106. SATVERSME [Constitution] art. 95 (Lat.).
107. LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [Constitution] art. 21 (Lith).
108. TEKST KONSTYTUCJI RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [Constitution]
ogłoszono w Dz.U. 1997, NR 78 poz. 483, pmbl., arts. 30, 41 (Pol.).
109. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA [Constitution] arts. 1, 13,
26, 59 (Port.).
110. USTAVA REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE [Constitution] arts. 21, 34 (Slovn.).
111. Ústava Slovenskej Republiky [Constitution] arts. 12, 19 (Slovk.).
112. CONSTITUCIÓN [C.E.] [Constitution] pmbl., arts. 10, 47 (Spain).
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that human dignity is a general principle of European law.113
The preeminent role accorded to human dignity is a key
difference between the construction of free speech rights in the
United States and Europe.
Although the United States
Supreme Court has referred to the term ―human dignity‖ in its
jurisprudence, those references are limited.114 Without a
doubt, the concept of human dignity is a more robust source of
rights protections in European constitutional jurisprudence
than in the United States.115 The level of constitutional
protection accorded to human dignity necessarily restricts the
scope of free speech protections. Accordingly, under the ECHR,
free speech is a ―qualified right‖ rather than an ―absolute
right.‖116 Consequently, it is permissible for a state to restrict
the right ―if it is necessary in a democratic society to do so and .
. . there is a legal basis for such limits.‖117
The value that the European community places on human
dignity ensures that the right to free speech in some cases may
be subordinated to the protection of human dignity. In the
German hierarchy of constitutional rights, for example, human
dignity, free development of one‘s personality, and protection of
personal honor rank higher than free speech in the Basic Law‘s
hierarchy of values.118 The privileged position that human
dignity and other values enjoy in the German Basic Law is not
unique.
The shared history of the Holocaust led many
European countries to restrict hate speech.119 In fact, one could
argue that Europe‘s post-war criminalization of hate speech,
113. See, e.g., Case C-377/98, Neth. v. Parliament, 2001 E.C.R. 1-7079
(upholding German restrictions on the marketing of laser video games on the
grounds that they violated human dignity).
114. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the
execution of individuals with mental retardation violates the Eighth
Amendment). See also, e.g., R. George Wright, Dignity and Conflicts in
Constitutional Values: The Case of Free Speech and Equal Protection, 43 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 527 (2006) (arguing that the concept of dignity can help
explain and resolve conflicts between free speech and equal protection).
115. See Nolte, supra note 91, at 17.
116. KEIR STARMER, FRANCESCA KLUG, & IAIN BYRNE, BLACKSTONE‘S
HUMAN RIGHTS DIGEST 2 (2001).
117. ORG. FOR SEC. & COOPERATION IN EUR., COUNTERING TERRORISM,
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A MANUAL 67 (2007), available at
http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2007/11/28294_980_en.pdf.
118. Krotoszynski, supra note 94, at 1553-54.
119. Craig S. Smith, Free Speech and Hate Speech: French Ruling Roils
the Waters, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2005, at A6.
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and the body of judicial decisions upholding those
proscriptions, explains the ease with which European states
have so quickly elected to use speech-related prosecutions to
counter radical Islamic speech. While it is beyond the scope of
this article to trace the post-war implementation of hate speech
legislation to the nation-state level in Europe, in many ways
the road to the criminalization of terrorism-related speech was
paved by pre-existing prohibitions on hate speech.120
To understand the protection that the European
community affords free speech, we must examine community
law. The starting point for understanding the status of laws
regulating free speech and incitement is the European
Convention on Human Rights. The key provisions of the
ECHR are Articles 10 and 17. Article 10, which broadly defines
free speech, states:
Everyone has the right to freedom of
expression. [T]his right shall include freedom to
hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers. . . .
The exercise of these freedoms, since it
carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be
subject
to
such
formalities,
conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the
interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for
the protection of the reputation or the rights of
others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.121

120. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (―ICERD‖), which entered into force in 1969, played a
profound role in spurring the development of anti-hate speech legislation in
Europe. See Knechtle, supra note 95, at 46-48.
121. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 34, at art. 10, ¶¶ 1-2.
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Although the ECHR was enacted in 1950, it was not until
the late 1990s that the European Court of Human Rights
(―ECtHR‖) articulated a coherent doctrine that weighed state
safety concerns and the freedom of expression.122 Since that
date, the ECtHR has developed an analytical framework that it
applies to alleged Article 10 violations. In that framework,
freedom of expression enjoys an inferior status, as it is merely
a ―qualified right.‖123 Member states may restrict free speech
when it is ―necessary in a democratic society‖ to further ―the
interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, [or] for the prevention of disorder or crime.‖124 When
the ECtHR evaluates alleged Article 10 infringements, it
begins by determining whether or not the restriction fulfils a
―pressing social need‖ such as preserving public safety.125
On its face, Article 10 appears to open the door to
widespread state restrictions on speech. The mere presence,
however, of a ―pressing social need‖ does not justify broad state
restrictions on speech. If a particular restriction does fulfil a
―pressing social need,‖ the ECtHR will next examine whether
or not the government infringement is both necessary and
proportionate.126 The ECtHR does not conduct this analysis in
122. Stefan Sottiaux, TERRORISM AND THE LIMITATION OF RIGHTS: THE
ECHR AND THE US CONSTITUTION 88 (2008).
123. ANDREW LE SEUR, JAVAN HERBERG, & ROSALIND ENGLISH, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC LAW 364 (2d ed. 1999).
124. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 34, at art. 10, ¶ 2.
125. See Donohue, supra note 13, at 261-63, 308-310. States may also
justify speech restrictions under Article 17 of the Convention. Article 17
denies citizens the right to ―engage in any activity or perform any act aimed
at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth . . . in the
Convention.‖
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 34, at art. 17. Thus, in addition to the
power granted under Article 10, states may attempt to invoke Article 17 to
justify the need for state intervention that circumscribes speech. Any speech
that encourages or incites citizens to disrupt the democratic process may not
enjoy Article 10 protection because the speech transgresses the bounds of
Article 17.
126. See, e.g., Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 170-71
(1986) (finding a breach of Article 10 because the government‘s interference
with the defendant‘s exercise of freedom of expression was not ―necessary in a
democratic society . . . for the protection of the reputation . . . of others‖ and
that it was ―disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued‖); Handyside v.
United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 737 (1976) (holding that no
breach of Article 10 occurred because the government‘s interference with the
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a hermetic vacuum. It will examine the surrounding context
and will consider a state‘s historical circumstances in making
an assessment of the necessity of state action.127 In several
decisions, the ECtHR has determined that the context
surrounding the particular speech ―act‖ reduced or enhanced
the impact of the speech on national security.128 It has also
held that states may lawfully derogate from Convention rights
when necessary to combat the threat posed by terrorism as
long as restrictions on Convention rights satisfy the
proportionality requirement.129 By analyzing the link between
a particular speech act and its potential impact on the
surrounding socio-political environment, the ECtHR makes an
implicit calculus of the degree of risk that the speech posed to
the state. One can see how the ECtHR conducts this calculus
in two cases discussed below involving Turkey.
Turkey‘s ongoing struggle against the Kurdistan Workers‘
Party (―PKK‖) and the government‘s multiple attempts to
restrict speech made on the group‘s behalf have produced a rich
vein of Article 10 jurisprudence. As an analytical starting
point, the ECtHR has, on several occasions, determined and
reiterated that the PKK poses a security threat to the Turkish
government.130 This determination, standing alone, has not led
the ECtHR to sanction all government attempts to proscribe
political speech. Instead its rulings have hinged upon a close
examination of the context and the import of the speech itself.
The 1997 decision in Zana v. Turkey underscores this point.131
In that case, the ECtHR upheld Turkey‘s conviction of the
defendant‘s freedom of expression had a legitimate aim and was necessary).
127. Rekvényi v. Hungary, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 519, 521 (noting that
Hungary‘s totalitarian history should be considered in weighing the
constitutionality of restrictions placed on the freedom of expression of police
officers).
128. See, e.g., Polat v. Turkey, App. No. 23500/94, at ¶ 47 (1999) (Eur.
Ct.
of
H.R.),
available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=ht
ml&highlight=polat%20%7C%20turkey&sessionid=42559112&skin=hudocen.
129. See Jeremie J. Wattellier, Note, Comparative Legal Responses to
Terrorism: Lessons From Europe, 27 HASTINGS INT‗L & COMP. L. REV. 397,
405–08 (2004) (stating that Art. 5 permits such derogations under certain
circumstances).
130. See, e.g., Zana v. Turkey, App. No. 18954/91, 1997-VII Eur. H.R.
Rep. 667, 688.
131. Id.
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former mayor of Diyarbakir. While incarcerated in a military
prison, the ex-mayor made several statements to journalists
that were later published in a national daily newspaper. In the
statements the ex-mayor voiced his support for the PKK‘s
national liberation movement.
Although Zana, the former mayor, qualified his remarks by
stating that he did not support the massacre of women and
children, a Turkish court convicted him under Articles 168 and
312 of the Turkish Criminal Code.132 The ECtHR denied
Zana‘s petition after examining the political and security
circumstances that existed at the time that the interview was
published. Critically, the Court noted that the interview had
coincided with deadly PKK attacks on civilians in south-east
Turkey.133 On the basis of that fact, the ECtHR reasoned that
it was likely that the ex-mayor‘s statements could have
exacerbated the region‘s already explosive situation. For that
reason, the Court concluded that the sanction that Turkey
imposed on the petitioner could be considered as addressing a
pressing social need.
To pass muster under the Court‘s Article 10 analysis,
however, state action to restrict speech must be both
proportional and necessary to preserve public safety. The
source of the ―necessity‖ standard is the language in Article 10
that states that a restriction must be ―necessary in a
democratic society.‖134 Restrictions that are merely desirable
or reasonable do not satisfy the necessity standard.135 On its
face, the ―necessary and proportional‖ language used by the
ECtHR appears to be strikingly similar to the ―narrow
tailoring‖ requirement of the United States Supreme Court‘s
strict scrutiny test.136
Similarly, the requirement that
132. See id. at 675 (Article 168 punishes individual membership in an
armed gang or organization, while Article 312 declares that it is a crime to
―publicly . . . praise or defend an act punishable by law as a serious crime or
to urge the people to disobey the law,‖ or to ―publicly . . . incite hatred or
hostility between the different classes in society, thereby creating
discrimination based on membership of a social class, race, religion, sect or
region‖).
133. Id. at 672.
134. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 34, at art. 10, ¶ 2.
135. See, e.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
679 (1976).
136. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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government interference fulfil a social need on the magnitude
of public safety seems analogous to the ―compelling government
interest‖ prong of strict scrutiny.137 Crucially, however, it is
important to recognize that courts situated in different legal
cultures may use similar language to express doctrinal tests
applied differently in practice.138
In Europe‘s constitutional jurisprudence, government
restrictions on speech will only satisfy the proportionality
requirement if two conditions are satisfied. First, the objective
of the interference must provide sufficient justification.139
Second, there must be ―a rational connection between the
objective and the restriction in question and the means
employed.‖140 A key component of this analysis is a due process
notice requirement. According to that requirement, state
restrictions on speech must be prescribed by law in advance of
the government‘s enforcement actions.141 States must set forth
restrictions on speech in advance of potential violations as well
as define those restrictions with sufficient precision so that
citizens may adjust their conduct accordingly.142 As Roger
Errera points out, these two requirements parallel prohibitions
in American jurisprudence against overbreadth and
vagueness.143
To determine whether or not the government‘s interference
is necessary, the ECtHR closely examines the nature of the
audience. Echoing the decision in Zana v. Turkey, the ECtHR‘s
evaluation of the legality of government action has turned on
the specific nature of the audience as well as the timing of the
speech act. In decisions that address actions undertaken by
Turkey, the Court‘s reasoning indicates that the mere fact that
the PKK is operating in Turkey has not been a sufficient
137. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
138. I owe thanks to George Wright for pointing this out.
139. Roger Errera, Freedom of Speech in Europe, in EUROPEAN AND US
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 91, at 23, 31. See also D.J. HARRIS ET AL.,
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 443-44 (2d ed. 2009);
Nolte, supra note 91, at 9.
140. STARMER, KLUG, & BYRNE, supra note 116, at 9.
141. Larissis v. Greece, App. Nos. 23372/94, 26377/94, 26378/94, 1998-I
Eur. H.R. Rep. 329, 356. This requirement is consistent with one of the core
principles of the rule of law-the principle of legality.
142. See Errera, supra note 139, at 31.
143. Id.
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ground, standing alone, that necessitated government
restriction of speech. For example, in Incal v. Turkey, the
ECtHR held that Turkey had overstepped its bounds when it
convicted an individual for distributing a pamphlet that
criticized the actions taken by local authority against smallscale illegal trading and squatters‘ camps.144 In contrast to the
circumstances surrounding the speech act in Zana, in Incal the
ECtHR determined that criticism of specific government action,
which was unrelated to the PKK-incited unrest, was unlikely to
provoke the population. The Court stated explicitly that
nothing in the leaflet could be regarded as incitement to
violence, hostility, or hatred between citizens.145 In the Court‘s
eyes, mere criticism of a government that is unlikely to provoke
a strong public reaction does not justify government
interference. In determining the necessity of restrictions
designed to protect public safety, the ECtHR considers whether
or not the speech is likely to incite a broad, as opposed to a
local, reaction. The Court has tended to discount government
restrictions on inflammatory speech where that speech is likely
to reach only a small audience.146 Looking specifically at
decisions which address incitement-related speech, it appears
that the ECtHR will only uphold an Article 10 restriction if
there is a risk that the incitement will trigger the use of
violence, an uprising, or an armed resistance.147
An important counterweight to the need to preserve public
order is the public‘s ―right to know‖ information important to
public debate. The public‘s right to know weighs heavily in the
ECtHR‘s calculations when the subject matter is a matter of
general importance.148 This right to know, and the importance

481.

144. See Incal v. Turkey, App. No. 22678/93, 1998-IV Eur. H.R. Rep. 449,

145. Id. at 487.
146. See, e.g., Karatas v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 81 (striking
down restrictions on poems that were aggressive in tone because their limited
distribution substantially reduced their potential impact on national
security).
147. See Dirk Voorhoof, Terrorism and Freedom of Expression: Impact
on Media and Journalism, Presentation at the Council of Europe‘s Forum on
Anti-Terrorism Legislation and its Impact on Freedom of Expression and
Information
(May
27,
2009),
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/confantiterrorism/contributio
ns_27may09_en.asp (follow hyperlink after ―Dirk Voorhoof‖).
148. See, e.g., Tromsø v. Norway, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 289, 324-25.
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of public debate to the democratic process, are key themes in
the Court‘s jurisprudence. Given the importance of human
dignity in European jurisprudence, however, the scope of
debate is not unlimited. The constitutional right to human
dignity has a speech-restrictive effect on the terms of public
debate as it is bounded by such community values as
―pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness.‖149 The norms of
democratic governance in the European community promote
debate, but it is a debate that favors the protection of
individual and group dignity.
As a general rule, the ECtHR imposes a stiff
proportionality standard on government restriction of
discussions on matters of general public concern.150 For
example, in Thorgeirson v. Iceland, the Strasbourg Court found
that Iceland had violated Article 10 when it convicted a writer
who had written several articles criticizing police brutality on
defamation charges.151 The Court concluded that the content of
the articles was a matter of general public concern because
Thorgeirson was pushing for the appointment of an
independent commission to investigate complaints of police
brutality.152 The mere invocation of public concern however,
does not confer an unlimited right to free speech. States may
regulate speech that addresses matters of general public
concern if the character of the speech may incite violence.153
In sum, the ECHR establishes a framework within which
states must operate as they seek to balance liberty and
security. To survive an Article 10 challenge, government
restrictions on speech must serve an urgent social need. Where
the Court has found government actions to be neither
necessary nor proportionate to the goal of maintaining public
safety, the ECtHR has held that those restrictions have
violated Article 10. The Court‘s approach is consistent with the
fact that Article 10 is a qualified rather than an absolute right.
149. Errera, supra note 139, at 30 (quoting Handyside v. United
Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 754 (1976)).
150. Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 239 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25
(1992).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 25-28.
153. See Michael O‘Boyle, Right to Speak and Associate under
Strasbourg Case-Law with Reference to Eastern and Central Europe, 8 CONN.
J. INT‘L L. 263, 276 (1993).
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One key final point is that the ECtHR does not enjoy the
same power of review as enjoyed by the United States Supreme
Court. The ECHR grants member states a wide latitude of
flexibility, essentially establishing only a minimum floor of
rights protections. While the fundamental rights set out in the
Convention serve as general principles that are binding on
member states, the free speech protections enjoyed throughout
the European community are not monolithic. The ECHR
grants a ―margin of appreciation‖ to national authorities.154
Accordingly, member states may interpret and implement the
Convention in accord with their own national constitutional
frameworks and domestic legislation.155 To understand how
domestic
counterterrorism
legislation
challenges
the
protections established in the ECHR, it is necessary at this
point to turn to actions taken by the Council of Europe to
coordinate member states‘ responses to terrorism.
B.

European Union Council Framework
Combating Terrorism of 2002 & 2008

Decisions

on

In response to the threat posed by international terrorism,
the forty-seven member states of the Council of Europe have
adopted two key directives known as the Framework Decisions
on Combating Terrorism of 2002156 and 2008.157
These
Framework Decisions are binding actions that aim to outline
the direction of action undertaken by member states within the
European Union‘s third pillar.158
While the devastating
154. See, e.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1976). See also Janneke Gerards & Hanneke Senden, The Structure of
Fundamental Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, 7 INT‘L J.
CONST. L. 619, 645-51 (2009) (discussing how the European Court of Human
Rights applies the margin of appreciation doctrine).
155. J.P. Loof, Remarks at the Dutch Section of the International
Commission of Jurists Conference (―NJCM‖): Combating Terrorism with
Human Rights (Apr. 8, 2005). See also Casado Coca v. Spain, 285-A Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 20-21 (1994); Barfod v. Denmark, 149 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
12-14 (1989); Markt Intern Verlag GmbH v. Germany, 165 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 19-20 (1989).
156. Council Framework Decision 2002, supra note 12.
157. Council Framework Amendment 2008, supra note 12.
158. While Framework Decisions are binding on member states as to the
result that they seek to achieve, they leave the ―choice and method‖ of the
specific action undertaken by a Member state up to the Member state itself.
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attacks on American soil in 2001 led the Council to act, it was
the nature of the terrorist threat itself that necessitated and
triggered a region-wide response. Specifically, the initial
Framework Decision pointed to the emergence of international
terrorist networks that could deliver lethal and devastating
attacks as the key impetus behind the 2002 Decision.159 The
lack of borders within the European Union as well as the
inadequacy of traditional police and judicial responses in
combating terrorism have also played a role in shaping the
Council‘s response.160
For purposes of this article, the key provisions of the 2002
instrument include the provisions that define ―terrorist
offences‖ and ―terrorist groups.‖ This instrument defines a
terrorist group as ―a structured group of more than two
persons, established over a period of time and acting in concert
to commit terrorist offences.‖161 The Decision defines ―terrorist
offences‖ as offenses under national law that,
[G]iven their nature or context, may seriously
damage a country or an international
organisation where committed with the aim of:
 seriously intimidating a population, or
 unduly compelling a Government or
international organisation to perform or
abstain from performing any act, or
 seriously destabilising or destroying the
fundamental political,
constitutional,
economic or social structures of a country
or an international organisation.162
The principal advantage of the 2002 Decision is that it
harmonized the definitions of terrorism and terrorist groups
See Jolande Prinssen, Domestic Legal Effects of EU Criminal Law: A Transfer
of EC Law Doctrines?, in INTERFACE BETWEEN EU LAW AND NATIONAL LAW
311, 314 (D. Obradovic & N. Lavranos eds., 2007).
159. Memorandum from the Comm‘n of the European Cmtys. Proposal
for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism 3 (Sept. 19,
2001), available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/sep/terrorism.pdf.
160. Id. at 8.
161. Council Framework Decision 2002, supra note 12, at art. 2(1), 2002
O.J. (L 164) at 4.
162. Id. at art. 1(1), 2002 O.J. (L 164) at 4.
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used by Member States and established a structure of
appropriate sanctions and penalties for individuals convicted of
terrorism-related offenses. Although no provisions of the 2002
instrument explicitly circumscribe the freedom of expression,
critics have charged that governments might use the document
to enact and justify legislation that could target
demonstrations and protests.163 For our purposes here, it is
worthwhile to note that the main danger of these provisions is
that they may be, and indeed have been, combined with
subsequent provisions to greatly circumscribe the ambit of free
speech protections.
In the wake of the 2004 Madrid bombings, the Council of
Europe called for and subsequently drafted and enacted
amendments to the 2002 Decision that called on Member
States to criminalize ―offences linked to terrorist activities‖
with the aim of ―reducing the dissemination of those materials
which might incite persons to commit terrorist attacks.‖164 The
United Nations Security Council gave efforts to criminalize a
wider range of speech a boost when it issued a non-binding
resolution in September 2005.165 The resolution called upon
States to ―to adopt such measures as may be necessary and
appropriate and in accordance with their obligations under
international law to . . . [p]rohibit by law incitement to commit
a terrorist act or acts.‖166
Given that British Prime Minister Tony Blair played a key
163. See, e.g., Statewatch News Online, EU to Adopt New Rules on
Terrorism,
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/sep/14eulaws.htm
(last
visited Jan. 12, 2010) (alleging that Article 3 of the 2002 Framework Decision
could embrace a range of demonstrations and protests).
164. Council Framework Amendment 2008, supra note 12, 2008 O.J. (L
330) at 21.
165. S.C. Res. 1624, ¶ 1(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005). The
resolution called upon states to ―to adopt such measures as may be necessary
and appropriate and in accordance with their obligations under international
law to . . . [p]rohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts.‖ Id.
While the members of the Security Council condemned any attempts to
glorify and incite terrorist acts, the resolution also reminded states of their
duty to protect the freedom of expression under both Article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 74-75, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 183rd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), and
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A, at 55, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
166. S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 165, at ¶ 1(a).
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role in drafting the Security Council resolution, it is
unsurprising that the Council of Europe quickly directed its
energies towards adopting a similar measure. The proposed
original Amendment to the 2002 Framework Decision called for
a wide range of incitement-related provisions. In particular,
the proposal called for legislation that would criminalize speech
that included ―public expressions of support for terrorist
offences and/or groups‖; ―the instigation of ethnic and religious
tensions which can provide a basis for terrorism‖; ―the
dissemination of ‗hate speech‘ and the promotion of ideologies
favourable to terrorism.‖167 In its final form, the Amendment
was slightly narrower in scope. The Amendment requires
member states to enact legislation that criminalizes the acts of
―public provocation to commit a terrorist offence[,] recruitment
for terrorism[, and] training for terrorism.‖168
The Amendment‘s strength is that it directs member states
to criminally target individuals who transmit specific
knowledge and expertise such as bomb-making information—
information which has a large potential to lead to significant
harm. However, the Amendment has serious flaws as well.
Considered in conjunction with each other, the Framework
Decision and the Decision‘s Amendment open the door to
significant state regulation of speech. There are three main
problems with the Council of Europe‘s approach. First, the
legislation potentially criminalizes legitimate democratic
discourse. Second, the instrument dramatically attenuates the
previously required link between speech and conduct. Finally,
the instrument allows Member States to demonstrate only a
tenuous link between the speech act and the subsequent
violent conduct before sanctioning the speech.
The starting point for analyzing these three problems is
the European Union‘s definition of terrorism set forth in the
initial Framework Decision.169 To begin, the definition should
167. Ben Hayes, Criminalising Free Speech, SPECTREZINE, Oct. 28, 2008,
http://www.spectrezine.org/europe/Hayes2.htm.
168. Council Framework Amendment 2008, supra note 12, at art.
1(2)(a)-(c), 2008 O.J. (L 330) at 23. See also Press Release, Council of Eur.,
Amendment of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (Apr. 18,
2008),
available
at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/255.
169. Council Framework Decision 2002, supra note 12, at art. 1(1), 2002
O.J. (L 164) at 4.
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be seen as a step forward because it contains both subjective as
well as objective elements. The definition‘s objective element
includes language that relates to a series of specific actions
such as bombings, attacks against shipping and aircraft,
hostage-taking, attacks involving nuclear material, and attacks
against internationally protected persons.170 Standing alone,
the catalogue restricts the scope of government discretion with
respect to the list of crimes that may qualify as a terrorist act.
Unfortunately the catalogue of acts does not stand alone as the
definition includes a subjectively drawn ―motive‖ element that
possesses the power to transform an ordinary criminal act into
an offense committed by a terrorist. Those motives include
―seriously intimidating a population‖ and ―unduly compelling a
Government or international organisation to perform or
abstain from performing any act.‖171 These subjective elements
open the door to a wide range of potential actions that may be
subsumed within the definition. Indeed, depending on a
prosecutor‘s motives, the potential list of free speech activities
that fall within the ambit of those definitions could include, for
example, protests against the World Trade Organization and
the G8, as well as calls for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq
and Afghanistan. The key problem is that the provision grants
prosecutors a wide berth in identifying what speech ―seriously
intimidates a population.‖
By necessity, the process of
determining what speech falls within this category involves a
subjective process of interpretation.
Consequently, law
enforcement personnel may presume the motive or intent of the
speaker based on identifying characteristics of the speaker
such as religion or race.
The problems with the Amendment are most apparent
when the definition of terrorism detailed in the Framework
Decision is read in conjunction with the Amendment. The
Amendment mandates that Member States enact penal code
provisions criminalizing the act of ―public provocation to
commit a terrorist offence.‖172 It defines provocation as the:

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Council Framework Amendment 2008, supra note 12, 2008 O.J. (L
330) at ¶ 9.
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[D]istribution, or otherwise making available, of
a message to the public with the intent to incite
the commission of one of the offences listed in
Article 1(1)(a) to (h), where such conduct,
whether or not directly advocating terrorist
offences, causes a danger that one or more such
offences may be committed.173
The pivotal problem with the definition of provocation is that it
does not require the offending conduct be directly linked with
the advocacy of terrorist offences. As a result, it is possible
that an individual‘s written or oral support for causes, such as
the Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation, could fall
within the Council‘s definition of public provocation of
terrorism.174 The International Commission of Jurists has
alleged that this provision will allow Member States to

173. Id. at art. 1(1), 2008 O.J. (L. 330) at 22 (amending Council
Framework Decision 2002, supra note 12, at art. 3(1)(a)). The offenses listed
in Article 1(1)(a) through (h) include:
(a) attacks upon a person's life which may cause death;
(b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;
(c) kidnapping or hostage taking;
(d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public
facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility,
including an information system, a fixed platform located on
the continental shelf, a public place or private property
likely to endanger human life or result in major economic
loss;
(e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or
goods transport;
(f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply
or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or
chemical weapons, as well as research into, and
development of, biological and chemical weapons;
(g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods
or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life;
[and]
(h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power
or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of
which is to endanger human life . . . .
Council Framework Decision 2002, supra note 12, at art. 1(1)(a)-(h), 2002
O.J. (L 164) at 4.
174. See Hayes, supra note 167.
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criminalise ―legitimate political debate.‖175 Just as seriously,
the Council‘s decision to target content that may be linked with
terrorism could lead government law enforcement agencies to
monitor press activity, work to identify protected sources, and
monitor journalists‘ research activities.176 These problems are
not merely speculative. As demonstrated in earlier research,
prosecutors responding to domestic political unrest have
previously used the cover of terrorism to prosecute the political
opposition.177 In 2007, the Council of Ministers themselves
cautioned that governments might be tempted to impose undue
restrictions on the exercise of the principle of freedom of
expression.178 The Council warned states not to ―use vague
terms when imposing restrictions of freedom of expression and
information in times of crisis.‖179
The second major problem with the Amendment is that it
dramatically broadens the criminal definition of incitement.
Specifically, the Amendment removes any requirement that the
conduct directly incite the commission of terrorist acts. The
absence of a requirement of a direct link between speech and
conduct drastically curtails the ambit of speech protection. In
contrast, the American incitement standard defined in
Brandenburg v. Ohio requires the state to show that the
advocacy ―is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action‖ and is ―likely to incite or produce such action‖ before
the state may regulate expression that advocates the use of

175. INT‘L COMM‘N OF JURISTS, BRIEFING PAPER: AMENDMENT TO THE
FRAMEWORK DECISION COMBATING TERRORISM—PROVOCATION TO COMMIT A
TERRORIST OFFENCE 2 (2008), available at http://www.icj.org/IMG/FD2007650.pdf.
176. Letter from Max von Abendroth, Dir. of Commc‘n & Sustainability,
European Fed‘n of Magazine Publishers, to Maria del Carmen Guilleu-Sanz,
European
Comm‘n
(Feb.
9,
2007),
available
at
http://www.faep.org/upload/FAEP%20position%20on%20Combating%20Terro
rism%2009022007.pdf.
177. See Boyne, supra note 26, at 81 (maintaining that German
prosecutors used anti-terrorism statutes to prosecute squatters).
178. Eur. Consult. Ass‘n, Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe on Protecting Freedom of Expression and Information in
Times
of
Crisis,
117th
Sess.,
Doc.
No.
CM/Del/Dec(2007)1005/5.3/appendix11E, pmbl. ¶ 3 (2007), available at
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/fight_against_terrorism
/2_adopted_texts/Guidelines%20media%202008%20E.pdf.
179. Id. ¶ 19.
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force or violation of law.180
Thirdly, an additional risk that accompanies incitement-toviolence statutes is situated in the specific context of terrorism.
These statutes run the risk that the link between speech and
subsequent violent conduct will be neither immediate nor
direct, but extremely tenuous. Because many governments
now consider that terrorism will pose a threat far out into the
future, the fight against terrorism may last a lifetime.181
Viewed in this light, one can imagine that a prosecutor could
charge a speaker under these provisions for a communication
made five years prior to a particular terrorist act.
These problems demonstrate how the Amendment‘s
incitement-related provisions enlarge the sphere of state
interference with speech.
The major flaw with the
Amendment, however, is that it expands prosecutorial
discretion to a degree that is unwarranted by the legislation‘s
efficacy in fighting terrorism. The research presented in the
first section of this Article demonstrates that there are many
paths to becoming a radical Islamic terrorist. Merely reading
or listening to radical speech does not by itself transform an
individual into a terrorist.
Thus, efforts to criminalize
provocation are likely to restrict speech over-broadly with little
chance of crippling the radicalization process. Legislation at
the member state level that criminalizes indirect speechrelated incitement will not put a meaningful stop to
radicalization. Instead, it is likely that the anti-provocation
provisions will merely drive speech underground to places that
are more difficult for governments to monitor. Ironically, it is
the success of counterterrorism efforts themselves that has
diffused the impact of incitement-related speech. For example,
one reason that the internet has come to play a more
prominent role in the recruitment process is that police stepped
180. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
181. From 1917 to 1969, there was a major debate in the United States
concerning the problem of organized anti-government conspiracies that might
smolder over time. See generally Peter Knight, Making Sense of Conspiracy
Theories, in CONSPIRACY THEORIES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
15, 17-24 (Peter Knight ed., 2003) (discussing the historical role conspiracy
theories have played in the cultural and political framework of American
history). In the wake of 9/11, this debate has reignited. See, e.g., Tom
Squitieri, Top General: War on Terror Will Last Lifetime, USA TODAY, June
16, 2004, at 8A.
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up their surveillance of radical mosques. Evidence suggests
that police surveillance of radical mosques has caused
radicalizers to direct potential recruits to stay away from
mosques.182
The research on radicalization suggests that attempts to
criminalize speech that only has an indirect or tenuous
relationship with a violent terrorist act will greatly expand
governments‘ power to punish speech with little impact on
counterterrorism efforts. Despite the fact that the provocationrelated legislation runs the risk of chilling debate, the majority
of Member States have adopted legislation in compliance with
the Amendment.
Before examining the shift in the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the legislative action that several
Member States have taken to comply with the Amendment to
the Common Framework Decision on Terrorism will be briefly
explained.
C. The Legislative “Response” by Member States
Though the Council of Europe‘s Member States adopted
the Framework Amendment following the London and Madrid
bombings, a number of states enacted incitement-related
provisions prior to the Council‘s actions. In particular, France
and Spain had enacted legislation criminalizing the advocacy
and glorification of terrorism well before 9/11. The date of the
French legislation reaches all the way back to 1881,183 while
the original Spanish provisions date back to 2000.184 Moreover,
in those states that had not adopted legislation that specifically
criminalized incitement to terrorism, prosecutors used existing
statutes that criminalized the incitement of general crimes to
achieve similar purposes.185 The major sea change that
182. HOUSE OF COMMONS, REPORT OF THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE
BOMBINGS IN LONDON ON 7TH JULY 2005, 2005-6, H.C. 1087, at 31 (U.K.),
available
at
http://www.officialdocuments.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc10/1087/1087.pdf.
183. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
184. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
185. ANNA OEHMICHEN, TERRORISM AND ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION:
THE TERRORISED LEGISLATOR? 238 (2009) (describing the adoption of antiorganized crime acts in Germany in the early 1990s, which were
simultaneously applied in the prosecution of terrorists). See also JAMES
BECKMAN, COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACHES TO HOMELAND SECURITY AND
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occurred after the London bombings was that Europe as a
whole aimed to shift the focus of its counterterrorism strategy
to preventive measures.
Those measures included more
comprehensive deportment and detention policies, as well as
policies specifically designed to disrupt the radicalization and
The true import of these
recruitment process.186
criminalization statutes can only be understood against this
backdrop. When statutory language grants prosecutors wide
discretion, and when prosecutors exercise that discretion
against a backdrop of broad public support for the state‘s
counterterrorism policies, the door is open for prosecutorial
overreaching.
The extent and character of that overreaching depends on
the shape of a particular state‘s legislation. Despite the fact
that the 2008 Amendment requires Member-States to
criminalize the incitement to terrorism, states have enjoyed
great latitude in choosing how to translate those requirements
into domestic legal regimes.187 European prosecutors who seek
to criminally punish individuals who engage in incitementrelated speech now possess a plethora of penal code provisions
to facilitate that task. As of this date, many European penal
codes contain provisions that criminalize speech that glorifies
or intends to incite terrorism. Some of those provisions are
detailed in Table 1 below:

ANTI-TERRORISM 55 (2007) (discussing how the U.K. initially used traditional
criminal offenses to combat terrorism).
186. BANISAR, supra note 20, at 8, 10.
187. Rory Brady, Terrorism and the Rule of Law: A European
Perspective, 48 VA. J. INT‘L L. 647, 655 (2008) (pointing out that each state
enjoys a liberal margin of appreciation in shaping its response to terrorism in
its territory).
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TABLE 1: LEGISLATION THAT CRIMINALIZES SPEECH
State
France

Germany

Provision
Language
Article 24 of the French Punishes
Press Act of 1881
incitement and
glorification of
terrorism188
Section 140 of the Penal Punishes
Code
statements that
Section 129 of the Penal approve of
Code
unlawful acts189

188. Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse [Law on Liberty of
the Press of July 29, 1881], Journal Officiel de la République Français [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], July 29, 1881, p. 125, at art. 24 (Fr.), available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070
722&dateTexte=20090723 (―Seront punis des peines prévues par l'alinéa 1er
ceux qui, par les mêmes moyens, auront provoqué directement aux actes de
terrorisme prévus par le titre II du livre IV du code pénal, ou qui en auront
fait l'apologie.‖) (translated by author). This Act prohibits the advocacy of
terrorism by means of:
[S]peeches, shouts or threats proffered in public places or
meetings, or by written words, printed matter, drawings,
engravings, paintings, emblems, pictures or any other
written spoken, or pictorial aid, sold or distributed, offered
for sale or displayed in public places or meetings, either by
posters or notices displayed for public view, or by any means
of electronic communication.
Id. at art. 23 (―discours, cris ou menaces proférés dans des lieux ou réunions
publics, soit par des écrits, imprimés, dessins, gravures, peintures, emblèmes,
images ou tout autre support de l'écrit, de la parole ou de l'image vendus ou
distribués, mis en vente ou exposés dans des lieux ou réunions publics, soit
par des placards ou des affiches exposés au regard du public, soit par tout
moyen de communication au public par voie électronique‖) (translated by
author).
189. Strafgesetzbuch
[StGB]
[Penal
Code]
Nov.
13,
1998,
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl.I] [Federal Law Gazette I] 945, 3322, § 140, ¶
2 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm
(stating that whoever ―publicly, in a meeting or through dissemination of
writings . . . , and in a manner that is capable of disturbing the public peace,
approves of one of the unlawful acts named in Sections 138 . . . , after it has
been committed or attempted in a punishable manner‖ shall be punished
(translation provided by the German Federal Ministry of Justice)). The
crimes that qualify pursuant to Section 138 include preparation for a war of
aggression, high treason, counterfeiting of money, human trafficking, and
murder, manslaughter or genocide. Id. § 138, ¶¶ 1-9 (translation provided by
the German Federal Ministry of Justice).
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Punishes
individuals who
support or recruit
for certain types of
organizations190
Article 578 of the Penal Prohibits
Code
glorification of
terrorism as well
as the ―commission
of acts tending to
discredit, demean,
or humiliate the
victims of terrorist
offences or their
families.‖ 191

190. Id. § 129a, ¶ 1(1) (stating that ―[w]hoever forms an organization,
the objectives or activity of which are directed towards the commission of . . .
murder, manslaughter, or genocide . . . ; crimes against personal liberty . . . ;
or crimes . . . dangerous to the public . . . shall be punished with
imprisonment from one year to ten years‖) (translation provided by the
German Federal Ministry of Jusice); id. § 129a, ¶ 3 (stating that ―[w]hoever
supports an organization indicated in subsection (1) or recruits for it, shall be
punished with imprisonment from six months to five years‖) (translation
provided by the German Federal Ministry of Justice).
191. Código Penal [C.P.] [Penal Code] art. 578 (Spain) (―o la realización
de actos que entrañen descrédito, menosprecio o humillación de las víctimas
de los delitos terroristas o de sus familiares‖) (translated by author),
available
at
http://www.searchsystems.net/frame.php?id=7e48b4dd816f468eb66edf976bb1
6d29&delay=true&nid=1215. The Spanish Penal Code defines provocation as
the ―direct incitement, through the press, radio or any other similarly
effective means of publicity, or before a group of individuals, to the
perpetration of the offence.‖ Id. art. 18(1) (―La provocación existe cuando
directamente se incita por medio de la imprenta, la radiodifusión o cualquier
otro medio de eficacia semejante, que facilite la publicidad, o ante una
concurrencia de personas, a la perpetración de un delito.‖) (translated by
author). The Code defines apologie as:
The expression, before a group of individuals or by any other
means of communication, of ideas or doctrines that extol
crime or glorify the perpetrator therof. Apologie shall be
criminalized only as a form of provocation and if its nature
and circumstances are such as to constitute direct
incitement to commit an offense.
Id. (―Es apología, a los efectos de este Código, la exposición, ante una
concurrencia de personas o por cualquier medio de difusión, de ideas o
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2006
Law

Counterterrorism Sanctions those
who ―make
propaganda for a
terrorist
organization or for
its aims.‖192
Anti-Terrorism Act 2006
Criminalizes
statements that
may be understood
as encouraging or
glorifying
terrorism193

Many of the problems with the 2008 Amendment detailed
in the preceding Section have not been corrected at the member
state level. For example, legislation introduced in several
states allows the state to convict an individual of
encouragement or incitement to terrorism where the
encouragement is merely indirect. Where statutes criminalize
mere indirect encouragement, a prosecutor need not show a
cause-and-effect relationship between the speech act in
question and the preparation for or commission of a specific act
of terrorism. Proof for this premise can be seen in the United
Kingdom‘s Terrorism Act of 2006. The Act, which prohibits the
doctrinas que ensalcen el crimen o enaltezcan a su autor. La apología sólo
será delictiva como forma de provocación y si por su naturaleza y
circunstancias constituye una incitación directa a cometer un delito.‖)
(translated by author).
192. Law to Fight Terrorism, No. 3713, art. 7(2) (1991), amended by No.
5532, art. 6 (2006) (Turk.). See also BANISAR, supra note 20, at 21.
193. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 1(3) (Eng.).
For the purposes of this section, the statements that are
likely to be understood by members of the public as
indirectly encouraging the commission or preparation of
acts of terrorism . . . include every statement which—
(a) glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the
past, in the future or generally) of such acts or offences; and
(b) is a statement from which those members of the public
could reasonably be expected to infer that what is being
glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be
emulated by them in existing circumstances.
Id.
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indirect encouragement of the preparation or commission of
terrorist acts, includes statements that:
(a) glorif[y] the commission or preparation
(whether in the past, in the future or generally)
of such acts or offences; and
(b) [are] statement[s] from which those members
of the public could reasonably be expected to
infer that what is being glorified is being
glorified as conduct that should be emulated by
them in existing circumstances.194
According to the language of this statute, it would appear that
a statement that in any way commented positively on a past
terrorist act would fall under the statute‘s scope. It is
conceivable that a statement to the effect, for example, that
―the London bombers executed a near flawless plan,‖ might rise
to the level of glorifying terrorism under this statute.195 Critics
of the legislation have raised concerns that the statute will
restrict reporting.196
The broad scope of these provisions has drawn criticism
from human rights organizations as well.
The United
Kingdom-based human rights organization, the National
Council for Civil Liberties (―Liberty‖), has questioned whether
these provisions will ―inhibit[ ] legitimate freedom of
expression.‖197 Liberty has charged that the provision that
criminalizes the encouragement and glorification of terrorism
goes ―far beyond what the Convention require[s].‖198 Unlike
194. Id.
195. Eric Barendt, Threats to Freedom of Speech in the United
Kingdom?, 28 U. N.S.W. L.J. 895, 896 (2005).
196. IAN CRAM, TERROR AND THE WAR ON DISSENT: FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF AL-QAEDA 103-05 (2009) (discussing the effect of
the United Kingdom‘s Terror Act of 2006 dissemination provision on news
broadcast organizations, academic institutions, and libraries).
197. JAGO RUSSELL & ETHAN HUNT, NAT‘L COUNCIL FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES,
LIBERTY‘S RESPONSE TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COUNCIL OF
EUROPE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM 3 (2006), available at
http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy06/council-of-europeconvention-on-terrorism.pdf.
198. Id. at 4. Liberty argues that the Terrorism Act of 2006 created
broad new offenses that ―have had a disproportionate impact on . . . rights
and freedoms.‖ Id.
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the Convention, the Terrorism Act of 2006 does not require
that a person who makes a statement or publishes a document
actually ―intend to incite the commission of a terrorist
offence.‖199 Thus, statements that only indirectly encourage
terrorism, including statements made by speakers who did not
specifically intend to incite or glorify a terrorist act, fall within
this statute‘s ambit.200 What is more, the legislative language
allows the government to criminally sanction statements that
merely glorify terrorist acts or the preparation for those acts.
As a result, this new legislation has definitively widened the
scope of the law prohibiting incitement by eviscerating any
intent requirement, and by widening the scope of the law to
include glorification.201
Spain has joined the United Kingdom at the forefront of
efforts to broaden the application of its penal code to speechrelated conduct.202 Spain‘s enactment of provisions related to
incitement and glorification of terrorism is unsurprising given
the nature of the Spanish government‘s ongoing battle with
ETA.203 In considering the scope of the Spanish legislation, it
is also important to note that Spain‘s experience with
democratic governance and toleration of political dissent is a
relatively recent one. The Spanish provisions allow the
government to punish support or encouragement of a criminal
offense.204 On their face, these provisions appear to be even
more susceptible to overbreadth problems than the United
Kingdom‘s provisions.
The terms of the Spanish code
criminalize ―any praise or justification of terrorist offenses or of
those involved in committing them through any form of public
199. Id. at 5.
200. See id. at 5-6.
201. See Ben Saul, Speaking of Terror: Criminalising Incitement to
Violence, 28 U. N.S.W. L.J. 868, 870-71 (2005) (Austl.).
202. See Código Penal [C.P.] [Penal Code] art. 18.1 (Spain); supra note
191 (discussing the relevant content of the Código Penal).
203. The Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (―ETA‖), a Spanish separatist
organization founded in 1959 and currently classified as a terrorist
organization by Spain, the United States, and other countries, has been
responsible for numerous acts of terrorism for the past four decades. See
PREETI BHATTACHARJI, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, BASQUE FATHERLAND
AND LIBERTY (ETA) (SPAIN, SEPARATISTIS, ESUKADI TA ASKATASUNA) (2008),
available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/9271;%20Who%20are%20Eta?;
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europ/3500728.stm.
204. See C.P. art. 18.1; supra note 191.
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expression or broadcast.‖205 Notably, the law grants the
government the power to criminally sanction any praise or
justification of terrorist offenses or of the perpetrators of
terrorist offenses through any form of public expression. The
ambit of speech that may fall under this provision is especially
broad because Spain‘s definition of terrorist offenses includes
acts that are typically categorized as common offenses.206
Spanish law even goes so far as to prohibit speech that insults
victims of terrorist acts or their families.207 The potentially
broad reach of this statute was underscored when the
government attempted to use it to prosecute a punk band on
the grounds that their lyrics glorified terrorism and degraded
victims.208
Ironically, in 1995, Spain had moved to restrict
prosecutions under the Spanish crime of apology by
implementing a requirement that forced prosecutors to show
that the speech in question qualified as a direct and intentional
incitement. This move towards greater protection of speech
lasted a mere five years.209 Concerned about the ETA‘s
obstinacy, Spain reintroduced the crime of exalting terrorism
in the Organic Act of 2000.210 The violent resurgence of ETA in
2000, which began with the end of a fourteen month ceasefire
in December 1999, played a key role in opening the government
to criticism that it had not acted aggressively enough towards
the organization.211 Seen in this context, it is unsurprising that
205. José Luis de la Cuesta, Anti-Terrorist Penal Legislation and the
Rule of Law: Spanish Experience, 2007 ELECTRONIC REV. INT‘L ASS‘N PENAL L.
1,
7
(follow
link
for
article
―A-03‖)
http://www.penal.org/?page=mainaidp&id_rubrique=41&id_article=158.
206. Those acts include ―arson and criminal damage, causing loss of
human life, causing serious bodily harm, abduction and unlawful detention.‖
Id. at 6. See also C.P. arts. 571, 572.1, 572.3, 573.
207. C.P. art. 578. See also BANISAR, supra note 20, at 21; supra note
191 and accompanying text.
208. BANISAR, supra note 20, at 21.
209. See PEDRO TENORIO, THE IMPACT OF ANTITERRORISM LEGISLATION IN
THE
FREEDOM
OF
SPEECH
IN
SPAIN
16-20,
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/confantiterrorism/Spain_PT
ENORIO_dec.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2010).
210. Organic Law 7/2000 of Dec. 22, 2000 (codified at C.P. art. 578),
amending Organic Law 10/1995 of Nov. 23, 1995.
211. Frank Griffiths, ETA Violence in 2000: A Year in Review,
SUITE101.COM,
Jan.
16,
2001,
http://www.suite101.com/article.cfm/spanish_politics/57590/1.
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the Spanish government‘s tolerance of critical speech narrowed
in 2000.
France‘s legislation criminalizing incitement and advocacy
of terrorism dates back to the Act of 28 July 1881 on the press
and media.212 The French legislature has enacted amendments
to this act that impose criminal penalties on offenders who
incite hatred or violence.213 While the act‘s language requires
that the speech constitute a direct incitement, the definition of
the types of speech that may qualify under this statute is so
broad that it could well include works of art. One can see this
by looking at the code itself. The code specifically states that
the incitement must have been communicated via:
[S]peeches, shouts or threats proffered in public
places or meetings, or by written words, printed
matter,
drawings,
engravings,
paintings,
emblems, pictures or any other written, spoke or
pictorial aid, sold or distributed, offered for sale
or displayed in public places or meetings, either
by posters or notices displayed for public view, or
by any means of electronic communication.214
In the French system, which reflects a legal tradition
dating back to the Napoleonic era, investigating magistrates
wield broad powers in conducting terrorism investigations.215
While the investigative judges have largely concentrated their
efforts on individuals involved in Islamic, Basque, and Corsican
separatist terrorist causes, their broad prevention-oriented
powers raise due process concerns. In particular, magistrates

212. Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse, J.O., July 29, 1881,
p. 125, at art. 24 (Fr.). See also supra note 188.
213. See, e.g., Law of July 28, 1991, J.O. at art. 24 (Fr.), available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070
722&dateTexte=19910728#LEGIARTI000006419712 (imposing correctional
penalties on ―those who, by any of the means referred to in article 23, incite
to hatred or violence against a person or group of persons on account of their
origin or membership or non-membership of a particular ethnic group,
nation, race or religion‖) (translated by author).
214. Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse, J.O., at art. 23.
See also supra note 188.
215. See Craig Whitlock, French Push Limits in Fight on Terrorism,
WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2004, at A1.
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possess the power to detain terrorism suspects on the mere
suspicion that they are associated with a group formed to
commit terrorist acts.216 Human rights groups have alleged
that French authorities are using this statute not to prosecute
individuals but rather ―to gather evidence about possible future
attacks.‖217 Given that French investigators have exploited the
vague language used in this statute to proactively detain
suspects, it is not surprising that the similarly ambiguous
language in the anti-incitement legislation has led to similar
overreaching.
This has proven to be the case with the enforcement of
anti-incitement related provisions in the French immigration
code. A law enacted in 2004 allows French authorities to use
administrative measures to expel non-citizens who are found to
have engaged in ―incitement to discrimination, hatred or
violence against a specific person or group of persons.‖218
French authorities have relied on this provision to expel noncitizens on the basis of unsigned intelligence reports that
disclose neither the source of the information nor the method
used to obtain the information. As the 2008 Human Rights
Watch report states:
In practice . . . the lack of precision of the legal
concept of a threat to public order, the
comparatively low standard of proof in the
system of administrative justice, and the benefit
of the doubt most judges accord the intelligence
216. See Code Pénal [C. PÉN] [Penal Code] art. 421-2-1 (Fr.), available at
http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=33&r=3794#art16571.
Legislation enacted in January 2006 makes participation in an association
formed for the purposes of committing a terrorist act that could lead to the
death of one or more persons a felony offense punishable by up to 20 years
imprisonment. Id. at art. 421-2-2. The statute punishes ―[t]he participation
in any group formed or association established with a view to the
preparation, marked by one or more material actions.‖ Id. at art. 421-2-1.
217. See UNITED KINGDOM PARLIAMENT JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: PROSECUTION AND
PRE-CHARGE
DETENTION
¶
92
(2006),
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200506/jtselect/jtrights/240/24005
.htm (follow ―Offence of ‗Association of Wrongdoers‘‖).
218. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF PREVENTION:
INSUFFICIENT SAFEGUARDS IN NATIONAL SECURITY REMOVALS 56-64 (2007),
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/06/05/name-prevention-0
(follow ―Download this report‖).
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reports, make it difficult for a person effectively
to contest the expulsion.219
In contrast to the actions taken by Spain, the United
Kingdom, and France, Germany has walked away from plans
to introduce a specific ―glorification of terrorism‖ offense. Nor
has Germany introduced legislation that specifically
criminalizes
the
act
―incitement
to
terrorism.‖
Notwithstanding these decisions, the German government still
has plenty of tools in its arsenal to target radical speech. These
tools include provisions that criminally sanction the incitement
of racial hatred.220 Under that provision, it is a crime to ―incite[
] hatred against segments of the population or [to] call[ ] for
violent or arbitrary measures against them.‖221
The
government may also ban groups that operate ―against the idea
of international understanding‖ contained in the German
Constitution.222
After 9/11 Germany stiffened existing
legislation and enacted new provisions regarding the offense of
recruitment for terrorist organizations, and has convicted
individuals for incitement-related activity under the statutes.
For example, in 2008, a German court convicted Ibrahim
Rashid for violations of Sections 129(a) and 129(b) for posting
videos of car bombings and sniper attacks with supportive
commentary.223
Taken as a whole, a key problem with the legislation
enacted in many European states is that prosecutors need not
establish an evidentiary link between speech and subsequent
harm to obtain a conviction. For example, under French law,
speech-related incitement is punishable even if it does not

219. Id.
220. Strafgesetzbuch
[StGB]
[Penal
Code]
Nov.
13,
1998,
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl.I] [Federal Law Gazette I] 945, 3222, § 130
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm.
221. Id. § 130, ¶ 1(1) (translation provided by the German Federal
Ministry of Justice).
222. Id. § 85, ¶ 1(2) (translation provided by the German Federal
Ministry of Justice).
223. For a detailed discussion of that case, see Shawn Marie Boyne, The
Criminalization of Speech in an Age of Terror: Casting a Wide Net for
Evildoers, in RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP, AND TORTURE: PERSPECTIVES ON EVIL, LAW
AND THE STATE 193 (John Parry & Welat Zeydanlioglu eds., 2009).
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incite the commission of a criminal offense.224 The omission of
any link thus allows prosecutors and courts to punish
individuals on the basis of mere speculation that the speech
could incite a terrorist act. Under the United Kingdom‘s 2006
Terrorism Act, the state has criminalized general acts of
―encouragement‖ of terrorism that are not tied to specific acts
of terrorism.225 Under this provision, individuals who make
statements recklessly may face criminal sanctions.226 The
danger with incitement legislation is that every idea taken to
its extreme may constitute incitement.227 Under Germany‘s
doctrinal framework, the link between speech and harm must
be more direct. As German legal scholar Abin Eser points out,
a mere ―indirect exhortation,‖ such as a general call for
murder, ―fall[s] within the ambit of protected expression‖ under
German law.228
Standing alone, this catalogue of legislative provisions does
not accurately portray the state of freedom of expression in
Europe. In states that have enacted specific provisions, their
presence does not guarantee that convictions will survive the
scrutiny of a state‘s highest court. For example, in December
2007, a lower court judge in the United Kingdom convicted the
so-called ―lyrical terrorist‖ for violating Section 58 of the
Terrorism Act of 2000 for possessing information useful to a
person committing or preparing an act of terrorism 229 Samina
Malik‘s crimes included the fact that she wrote and posted on
224. Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution
1624: Report of France in Response to the Questions of the Counter-Terrorism
Committee, in Letter from Ellen Margrethe Løj, Chairman, Security Council
Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) Concerning
Counter-Terrorism, to the President of the Security Council app. at 3, U.N.
Doc. S/2006/547 (July 19, 2006) (submitted on behalf of France by Jean-Marc
de La Sablière, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations).
225. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 1(3) (Eng.). See also supra notes 19394 and accompanying text.
226. See Raphael F. Perl, Head of the Org. for Sec. & Cooperation in
Eur. Action Against Terrorism Unit, Remarks at the Second International
Forum on Information Security (Apr. 7-10, 2008), available at
http://www.osce.org/documents/cio/2008/04/30594_en.pdf.
227. See BECKMAN, supra note 185, at 19.
228. Albin Eser, The Law of Incitement and the Use of Speech to Incite
Others to Commit Criminal Acts: German Law in Comparative Perspective, in
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND INCITEMENT AGAINST DEMOCRACY, supra note 36, at
119, 133.
229. Regina v. Malik [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1450, [1], [4], [15] (Eng.).
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websites poetry that glorified terrorism and also possessed
materials that could be helpful to terrorists.230 In June 2008,
however, the Court of Appeal quashed her conviction on the
grounds that it ―was unsafe.‖231 Ultimately, in the realm of the
criminal courts where appellate processes exist, the scope of
enforcement is shaped by judicial action.
Even Turkey‘s Constitutional Court has started to push
back on Turkey‘s Counterterrorism Law of 2006, which an
expert committee of the Council of Europe has criticized as
being ―ambiguous and written in wide and vague terms.‖232
While the Turkish government has repeatedly sought to punish
political opponents and non-incitement-related speech, in a
January 2008 decision, Turkey‘s Constitutional Court, by a
single vote, struck down a government ban on the pro-Kurdish
Democratic Society Party (―DTP‖), stating that ―statements
about the Kurdish problem fall within the boundaries of free
speech.‖233 However, in a separate ruling issued in December
2009, the Court reversed itself and unanimously banned the
party for its alleged links with the outlawed Kurdistan
Workers‘ Party (―PKK‖). In announcing the ruling, the court‘s
President, Hasim Kilic, stated that ―[i]t has been decided the
DTP will be closed under Articles 68 and 69 of the Constitution
and the Political Parties Law given that actions and
statements made by the party became a focal point for
terrorism against the indivisible integrity of the state.‖234
The absence of specific provisions that criminalize
incitement or glorification of terrorism does not mean that
prosecutors have not indicted individuals for incitement or
230. Id. [5], [15].
231. Id. [3].
232. EUR. PAR. ASS‘N, COMM. OF EXPERTS ON TERRORISM, Information on
Other Activities of the Council of Europe, 12th Meeting, at 21 (2007),
available
at
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_cooperation/fight_against_terrorism/3_codexter/working_documents/2007/COD
EXTER%20(2007)%2014%20E%20PACE.pdf.
233. Constitutional Court Decision No. 2008/1, 29/01/2008, 7 Jan. 2008,
Official Gazette of Turkish Republic, Serial No. 26925 (Turk.). See also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2009: EVENTS OF 2008, at 418 (2009),
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2009_web.pdf.
234. Constitutional Court Decision No. 2009/4, 11/12/2009, 14 Dec. 2009,
Official Gazette of Turkish Republic, Serial No. 27432 (Turk.). See also
Turkey Shuts Down Kurdish Political Party, ASBAREZ.COM, Dec. 11, 2009,
http://www.asbarez.com/74747/turkey-shuts-down-kurdish-political-party/.
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glorification related conduct using other provisions of a state‘s
legal codes. For example, the German government has banned
the activities of the radical Islamic group Hizb ut-Tahrir on the
ground that the group violated ―the concept of international
understanding.‖235 While there is no evidence that the group
issued calls to immediate violence in Germany, according to
some commentators, the group‘s rhetoric is ―evocative of
jihad.‖236
In sum, the aforementioned provisions may have troubling
political connotations for democratic governance in the Council
of Europe member states. Anxious to hand prosecutors more
tools to fight terrorism, many states have ignored the fact that
these increased government powers could be abused and used
to target political opponents. Depending on the lens through
which a government views the existing domestic political order,
some governments might recast complaints voiced by the
political opposition as threats to public order. The broad
definition of terrorism present in state-level legislation
increases the likelihood that anxious governments might affix
the terrorist label to the political opposition. While this
prospect may be less likely in a state with a strong post-war
record of democratic governance, it is a real concern in states
such as Armenia, Russia, Turkey, and the Ukraine.237 The
235. Sophie Lambroschini, Germany: Court Appeal by Hizb Ut-Tahrir
Highlights Balancing Act Between Actions, Intentions, RADIO FREE EUROPE
RADIO
LIBERTY,
Oct.
26,
2004,
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1055527.html.
236. Id.
237. See RUSSELL & HUNT, supra note 197, at 8-9 (arguing ‗[t]here is a
vast difference between proscribing groups involved in violence and terror
and non-violent political groups‖). See also, e.g., POLITICAL PARTIES AND
TERRORIST GROUPS 10 (Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, & Arie Perliger
eds., 2d ed. 2009) (indicating the political support of terrorism dating back to
1902 with the Social Revolutionary Party); Jonathan Head, Turkey Jails
Kurdish
Newspaper
Editor,
BBCNEWS.COM,
Feb.
10,
2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8509455.stm (discussing the ramification of
the criminal penalty imposed on a newspaper editor for publishing material
sympathetic to the outlawed PKK political party); Clifford J. Levy, For
Kremlin, Ukraine Vote Cut 2 Ways, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2010, at A1
(discussing Ukraine‘s political turmoil following the unsuccessful political bid
of Viktor F. Yanukovich in the 2004 Orange Revolution); Press Release,
Council of Eur., Commissioner Hammarberg Calls on the Armenian
Government to Lift Emergency Measures, Ensure Media Freedom and
Initiate an Impartial Investigation into Recent Violent Acts, (Mar. 18, 2008),
available
at

51

468

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

language of current anti-incitement statutes gives government
officials the ability to censor political viewpoints, should they
elect to use it.238 These problems led the Council of Europe‘s
Committee of Ministers in September 2007 to caution
European Union member states against using ―vague terms‖
such as the words ―incitement‖ and ―glorification‖ to limit
freedom of expression.239 In 2008, the United Nations Human
Rights
Committee criticized
the United
Kingdom‘s
―encouragement of terrorism‖ provisions noting that they were
―broad and vague‖ and lacked an intent requirement.240
This Section argues that, although some European states
enacted new legislation after the attacks on London and
Madrid that was hostile to freedom of expression, because the
anti-incitement and glorification statutes of some states predated those events, the ECtHR had already developed a
doctrinal roadmap that, in some cases, privileged national
security concerns. Thus, for the most part, the ECtHR has not
needed to drastically reshape that roadmap to accommodate
this new wave of legislation; a roadmap was already in place
that allowed states to privilege national security at the expense
of freedom of expression without infringing upon Article 10
restrictions when states could justify those restrictions on
national security grounds. Section III will show how that
opening has widened.
III. Widening the Door to Discretion: Reconsidering the
“Margin of Appreciation” in a Time of Terror
As shown in Section II, through the ―margin of
appreciation‖ doctrine, the ECHR grants Member States a wide
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1263815&Site=CommDH&BackColorInter
net=FEC65B&BackColorIntranet=FEC65B&BackColorLogged=FFC679.
238. See RUSSELL & HUNT, supra note 197, at 8-9 (alleging Section 21 of
the Terrorist Act of 2006 extends governmental power to censorship of nonviolent political groups and views.).
239. See BANISAR, supra note 20, app. at 39, ¶ 19.
240. U.N. Human Rights Comm. [UNHRC], Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6 (July 30,
2008),
available
at
http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/433/42/PDF/G0843342.pdf?OpenElement.
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degree of flexibility in complying with the Convention. This
flexibility is reflected in the ECtHR‘s pre-Madrid and London
bombings‘ Article 10 jurisprudence. In a post-London and
Madrid world, one would expect that margin of appreciation to
grow even wider in deference to heightened national security
Although the ECtHR developed free speech
concerns.241
jurisprudence prior to 9/11 that sought to balance national
security concerns with free speech, one would expect that the
unique characteristics of the threat posed by Islamic
fundamentalist-inspired terrorism might provide the Court
with the basis to privilege national security even further. The
diffuse nature of al-Qaeda‘s structure and the emergence of
home-grown terrorists on European soil differentiate the threat
posed by radical Islamic terrorism in comparison with domestic
groups such as the Irish Republican Army (―IRA‖) and the
ETA.242 A second critical difference stems from the frequency
with which al-Qaeda inspired groups use suicide bombers. The
widespread resort to suicide bombings has increased the
overall percentage of civilian casualties in contrast with the
domestic terrorism that European states have experienced in
the past.243 Finally, al-Qaeda‘s threat to use weapons of mass
terror such as nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons
categorically elevates the threat posed by terrorist groups
inspired by Islamic fundamentalism.244
The hypothesis that the ECtHR will expand the margin of
appreciation granted to states in the aftermath of Madrid and
London has so far been borne out by the Court‘s decision in
Leroy v. France.245 In that 2008 decision, which has been
241. Colm Campbell, Northern Ireland: Violent Conflict and the
Resilience of International Law, in NATIONAL INSECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
DEMOCRACIES DEBATE COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 15, at 56, 71.
242. Id. (arguing that al-Qaeda‘s diffuse structure poses a unique threat
to Europe).
243. Id.
244. Graham Allison, Op-Ed., Nuclear Terrorism Poses the Gravest
Threat Today, WALL ST. J. (Eur.), July 14, 2003, at A10, available at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1271/nuclear_terrorism_poses
_the_gravest_threat_today.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fby_type%2
Fop_ed%3Fgroupby%3D0%26filter%3D2003%26page%3D2.
245. Leroy v. France, App. No. 36109/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=ht
ml&highlight=leroy%20%7C%20v.%20%7C%20france%20%7C%2036109/03&
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condemned by human rights groups,246 the Court upheld the
conviction of a French cartoonist who had penned and
published an anti-American cartoon two days after the
attacks.247 The facts of Leroy are starkly dissimilar to the way
that incitement to terror is most commonly imagined in the
modern age. When asked to think of examples of speech that
might incite terrorism, one might imagine an internet website
that features videotaped images of actual terrorist attacks
coupled with a call to join the jihad. Against that backdrop, it
is difficult to see how a French court convicted cartoonist Denis
Leroy of complicity to incite terrorism for drawing a cartoon
that was published in a weekly paper. The cartoon portrayed
the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center with the
caption ―We have all dreamt of it . . . . Hamas did it.‖248
Published by the Basque weekly newspaper Ekaitza just two
days after the attacks, the cartoon provoked an outpouring of
critical letters and emails and led a French public prosecutor to
file incitement charges against the cartoonist.249 Surprisingly,
the prosecutor filed the charges even after the cartoonist
publicly attempted to distance himself from more provocative
interpretations of the cartoon. One week after the cartoon‘s
publication, the cartoonist explained that the purpose of the
cartoon was not to glorify violence but rather to communicate
his anti-Americanism through the use of satire and to
underscore the decline of American imperialism.250 Both the
French courts, as well as the ECtHR, concluded that the
cartoon condoned and glorified terrorism.251 The Pau Court of
Appeal explained its decision to uphold Leroy‘s conviction in
sessionid=41876423&skin=hudoc-en.
246. See Sandy Coliver, Incitement to Racial and Religious Hatred vs.
Freedom of Expression, HUM. RTS. ADVOC. (Human Rights Advocates,
Berkeley,
Cal.),
Winter
2008-2009,
at
5,
5-6,
available
at
http://www.humanrightsadvocates.org/images/HRA_vol52.pdf
(addressing
Leroy v. France‘s overly broad application of UN Security Council resolution
1624 to suppress legitimate speech).
247. Leroy, App. No. 36109/03, at ¶¶ 5-8.
248. Id. ¶ 6 (translated by author).
249. Id. ¶¶ 4-10.
250. Id. ¶ 27. See also Dirk Voorhoof, European Court of Human Rights:
Where is the ―Chilling Effect‖? 3 (May 27, 2009), available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/ConfAntiTerrorism/ECHR_e
n.pdf.
251. See Leroy, App. No. 36109/03, at ¶ 43.
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this manner:
[B]y making a direct allusion to the massive
attacks on Manhattan, by attributing these
attacks to a well-known terrorist organisation
and by idealising this lethal project through the
use of the verb ‗to dream‘, [the cartoonist]
unequivocally prais[ed] an act of death . . . and
justif[ied] the use of terrorism . . . [and]
indirectly encourage[ed] the potential reader to
evaluate positively the successful commission of
a criminal act.252
Although Leroy appealed his conviction to the ECtHR, the
Court held that the prosecution was consistent with the
purposes of Article 10, paragraph 2.253
There has been some debate among commentators as to
whether this decision signals a new direction in the Court‘s free
speech jurisprudence.254
Scholars such as Georg Nolte
maintain that the decision is a logical extension from prior
jurisprudence. Nolte has argued that because the Court has
previously held that governments may place limits on media
coverage of racist or right-wing activities, this decision does not
represent a departure for the Court.255 Other scholars have not
been so sanguine about the decision‘s impact, arguing that the
252. Voorhoof, supra note 250, at 1 (quoting and translating the text of
Leroy, App. No. 36109/03, at ¶ 42).
253. See Leroy, App. No. 36109/03, at ¶ 44.
254. See generally Voorhoof, supra note 250. But see Peter Noorlander,
Media Legal Def. Initiative, Address Before the Plenary Conference at the
First Council of Europe Conference of Ministers Responsible for Media and
New
Communication
Services
(May
29,
2009),
available
at
http://www.mediapolicy.org/peter-noorlander-on-media-and-terrorismreykjavik (alleging a growing trend among European governments to use
anti-terrorism laws to curb free speech and media freedom); Dick Voorhoof,
Reflections on Some Recent Restrictive Trends, Seminar on the European
Protection of Freedom of Expression at the Court of Human Rights (Oct. 10,
2008),
available
at
http://www-ircm.ustrasbg.fr/seminaire_oct2008/docs/Voorhoof_Final_conclusions.pdf
(identifying a restrictive trend in case law governing the breadth of freedom
of expression in Europe).
255. Nolte, supra note 91, at 12-13 (identifying the logical extension of
the historical role of European courts to restrict freedom of speech-a position
which has been adopted by the European Court of Human Rights).
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decision is part of a ―restrictive trend‖ in the Court‘s recent
freedom of expression jurisprudence.256
The decision in Leroy, however, is difficult to square with
the ECtHR‘s decisions in numerous cases involving alleged
state interference with the freedom of expression in Turkey.257
To be sure, 9/11 represented a new type of terrorist attack that
spawned a near crippling fear in western democracies in the
weeks following the attacks. It is also now clear that the
United
States
Government
deliberately
manipulated
intelligence, political imagery, and public fear for political
gain.258 At the time of the 9/11 attacks, there was no evidence
that France itself was an al-Qaeda target. Moreover, since
France was not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (―NATO‖) at the time of the attacks, NATO‘s
subsequent decision to invoke Article 5 of the NATO Treaty did
not make France a target.259 Moreover, the opinion expressed
in the cartoon coincided with French opinion: over seventy-five
percent of French voters stated that they felt that ―U.S. foreign
policy was . . . [partially] responsible for the rise of Islamic
256. Voorhoof, supra note 254 (noting that the other contributions to the
Seminar have shown this trend).
257. See, e.g., Karataş v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 81.
258. See AL GORE, THE ASSAULT ON REASON 23-24 (2007).
259. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34
U.N.T.S. 243. Article Five states:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or
more of them in Europe or North America shall be
considered an attack against them all and consequently
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective selfdefence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by
taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use
of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a
result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security
Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
restore and maintain international peace and security.
Id.
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extremism.‖260
In contrast, in cases such as Karatas v. Turkey261 and Zana
v. Turkey,262 the Turkish Government had concrete reasons to
fear that speech voiced in support of the PKK could incite
further acts of violence by separatist forces within Turkey. The
PKK initiated a campaign of armed violence within Turkey
beginning in 1984. The threat that the PKK represented was
not merely speculative. For these reasons, it is difficult to
explain why the Court condemned the actions of the Turkish
Government in Karatas and Zana on Article 10 grounds while
upholding the actions of France in Leroy, unless the Court‘s
jurisprudence has taken a less restrictive turn.
The ECtHR‘s decision in Leroy was followed by another
troubling decision in which the Court refused to overturn the
Turkish Government‘s decision to convict the owner and editorin-chief of a newspaper on charges of publishing the
declarations of terrorist organizations. In Saygili (No. 2) v.
Turkey,263 the applicants alleged that the Turkish Security
Court had violated Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention when
the Court criminally punished the applicants for publishing
statements by prisoners who opposed a new prison system in
the newspaper Yeni Evrensel.264 In the statements, detainees
who had been convicted or charged with supporting left-wing
armed organizations threatened to commence a hunger strike
and warned the government that they would refuse to enter
newly constructed cells.265
Among their demands, the
detainees had requested that the government abolish ―F‖ type
prison cells, reinstate prisoners‘ rights, repeal the antiterrorism law, abolish state security courts, and file charges
260. Rémy Davison, French Security After 9/11: Franco-American
Discord, in EUROPEAN SECURITY AFTER 9/11, at 69, 79 (Peter Shearman &
Matthew Sussex eds., 2004) (discussing the results of a poll).
261. Karatas, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 81.
262. Zana v. Turkey, App. No. 18954/91, 1997-VII Eur. H.R. Rep. 667.
263. Saygili v. Turkey (No. 2), App. No. 38991/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009),
available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=847384
&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142B
F01C1166DEA398649.
264. Id. ¶¶ 5-6, 10 (explaining that the Turkish prosecutor brought
charges under section 6/2 of Law no. 3713, section 2/1 of Law no. 5680, and
Article 36 of the former Criminal Code).
265. Id. ¶¶ 6-7.
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against torturers and perpetrators of massacres.266 In a 5-2
decision, the Court held that the state‘s action did not violate
Article 10.267 The two dissenting judges stated:
The majority considers that the message
conveyed by the newspaper was ―not a peaceful
one‖ and that it went beyond ―a mere criticism‖ of
the new prison system (§28).
Such a
consideration is disquieting. ‗Watchdogs‘ are not
meant to be peaceful puppies; their function is to
bark and to disturb the appearance of peace
whenever a menace threatens. A new and, in our
view, a dangerous threshold in the protection of
free speech has been reached if expression may
be suppressed, lawfully, because it is neither
―peaceful‖ nor confined to ―mere criticism‖. Such
qualifications are new conditions precedent to
the right to exercise such freedom and are not
reflected in this Court‘s case law.268
Despite the Court‘s decisions in those two cases, it has not
yet adopted the expansive interpretation of incitement adopted
by Turkish courts. In another 2008 decision, Yalçin Küçük v.
Turkey (No. 3), the ECtHR struck down a separate attempt by
Turkey to punish a private citizen‘s political speech.269 In that
case, Turkish prosecutors filed charges against a university
professor and writer who had spoken and written frequently on
the Kurdish question.270 In 1999, a Turkish court convicted the
professor on charges of inciting hatred and hostility, publishing
separatist propaganda, and belonging to and assisting an
armed group.271 The factual basis for the charge of assisting an
armed group was a television interview that the professor had
266. Id. ¶ 6.
267. Id. ¶¶ 31, 34.
268. Id. app. (Power, J. & Gyulumyan, J., dissenting).
269. Küçük (no 3) c. Turquie [Küçük v. Turkey (No. 3)], App. No.
71353/01,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
(2008),
available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=ht
ml&highlight=K%FC%E7%FCk%20%7C%20turkey%20%7C%2071353/01&se
ssionid=43078696&skin=hudoc-en.
270. See id. ¶¶ 4-19.
271. Id. ¶ 27.
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conducted with the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, in which
Küçük referred to Öcalan with the term ―Mister President.‖272
In its decision, the Court reasoned that, although some of the
statements made by Küçük were hostile in tone, only one of the
statements advocated the use of violence, armed resistance, or
uprising.273 While the Court found only one speech that
contained a single sentence constituting an incitement to
violence, the Court‘s finding condemned Küçük‘s conviction on
necessity and proportionality grounds.274
What conclusions can be drawn from Leroy and Saygili
with respect to the ECtHR‘s post-London direction? First,
because of the complexity of the Court‘s analysis, it may be too
early to determine whether the Court has indeed altered its
course. The balancing analysis that the Court engages in to
determine whether states may limit freedom of expression to
prevent terrorism is complex.275 Restrictions on free expression
in the name of national security or public order must still
satisfy the aforementioned tests of legality, necessity, and
proportionality.
Second, the Court enjoys substantial
discretion when it interprets whether or not there is a link
between speech and harm. For instance, in its decision in
Leroy v. France, the Court based its decision on its own
determination that the cartoon could lead the viewer to
determine that the 9/11 attacks were justifiable acts. The
Court reached this determination despite the fact that it is
unclear whether the cartoonist himself intended that this postattack questioning of United States policies would directly lead
to further terrorist attacks. Moreover, the Court‘s analysis did
not hinge on the cartoonist‘s intent to incite, but rather its own
post-event speculation of the potential impact of the cartoon.
The purpose of this speculation was merely to determine
whether the actions taken by the French Government against
the cartoonist were both necessary and proportionate. Because
the Court allows each state a margin of appreciation based on

272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. ¶ 22.
Id. ¶ 58.
Id. ¶¶ 59-60.
OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTS. & HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS
CONSIDERATIONS IN COMBATING INCITEMENT TO TERRORISM AND RELATED
OFFENCES
7
(2006),
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2006/10/21814_en.pdf.
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its domestic circumstances as well as its own unique legal and
cultural history, the Court grants states wide latitude when it
determines what is necessary and proportionate. In the
aftermath of 9/11, France‘s large Muslim population and past
history of domestic terrorism may have been sufficient to sway
the Court.
In Saygili (No. 2), the ECtHR again rested its holding on
its assessment of the speech‘s potential impact. The judges
presumed that the publication of the inmate‘s letters was
capable of inflaming discontent within the prison system. The
majority stated:
[T]he problem results from the wording of the
overall message given to the readers, where their
authors state that they will rather die than enter
the cells and call on others to take action in order
to support their general resistance and not to
content themselves with mere declarations. It is
clear that the message given is not a peaceful one
and cannot be seen as a mere criticism of the new
prison system.
While it is true that the
applicants
did
not
personally
associate
themselves with the views contained in these
declarations, they nevertheless provided their
writers, who expressed their affiliation to illegal
armed groups, with an outlet to stir up violence
and hatred. Accordingly, the content of these
declarations must be seen as capable of inciting
violence in the prisons by instilling an irrational
reaction against those who introduced or were in
charge of the new incarceration system.276
When the ECtHR‘s analysis of necessity rests on its
evaluation of possible incitement, tenuous causality between
speech and harm, or unclear intent, the danger exists that the
Court will open a wide door permitting broad state action to
276. Saygili v. Turkey (No. 2), App. No. 38991/02, ¶ 28, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2009),
available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=847384
&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142B
F01C1166DEA398649.
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proscribe speech. What is especially troubling about these two
cases is that the Court upheld government restrictions on the
press, the institution that plays a critical role in informing the
public and sparking debate. In Saygili (No. 2), the state
convicted the publisher and owner of the newspaper who had
merely published the letters and not written them.
To
determine whether it was necessary for the government to
impose a restriction to satisfy a pressing social need, the Court
based its analysis on the existence of a ―possible‖ social need
rather than a pressing one.277 Moreover, the Court‘s decision in
Leroy runs against its conclusion in Handyside v. United
Kingdom.278 In Handyside, the Court held that even in a
context of political violence, Article 10 protects ideas that may
―offend, shock or disturb the State or any section of the
population.‖279 A strong argument can be made that the
cartoon in Leroy fell into the category of offensive speech that
the Court previously protected in Handyside.
Still, the decisions in Leroy and Saygili (No. 2) do not by
themselves show that the ECtHR has abandoned its
commitment to protecting speech.
Notably, the Court‘s
decision in Saygili (No. 2) does not seem to indicate that the
European judges have grown more accommodating of Turkey‘s
repeated attempts to restrict speech under the guise of
protecting public order. Recent decisions of the Court have
struck down Turkish restrictions in several cases. In these
cases Turkey attempted to proscribe speech that included
references to the Kurdish independence movement or actions of
the PKK,280 criticisms of the military,281 non-violent political

277. See id. app. (Power, J. & Gyulumyan, J., dissenting).
278. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 737, 754
(1976).
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281. Kayasu c. Turquie (no 1) [Kayasu v. Turkey, (No. 1)], App. Nos.
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appeals,282 and interviews with PKK members,283 as
incitement-related
speech
that
justified
government
interference. In comparing the ECtHR‘s decisions in Leroy and
Saygili (No. 2) to this string of cases in which the Court found
Article 10 violations, the 2008 Turkish cases appear to set the
boundaries beyond which the Court has concluded that the link
between speech and potential incitement is too attenuated and
indirect.284 For example, in İsak Tepe v. Turkey, Turkey
indicted an individual on charges of making separatist
propaganda after he delivered speeches in which he referred to
―the heroes in the mountain‖ and ―the liberation of a nation.‖285
The Court condemned Turkey‘s actions and reasoned that
statements made by the applicant did not, by themselves, incite
violence.286 Additionally, the Court found several grounds to
condemn Turkey‘s restrictions on Article 10 in Kanat v.
Turkey.287 In that case, a Turkish court convicted the editor
and owners of the monthly magazine, Voice of the Free Woman,
on the charge of publishing a statement by a leader of an illegal
organization.288 In the published statement, the PKK leader
282. Özer c. Turquie [Özer v. Turkey], App. Nos. 35721/04 & 3832/05,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
(2009),
available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=850149
&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142B
F01C1166DEA398649.
283. Demirel v. Turkey (No. 3), App. No. 11976/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008),
available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=844063
&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142B
F01C1166DEA398649.
284. Press Release, Eur. Ct. H.R., Chamber Judgments Concerning
Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, and Turkey (Oct. 21, 2008), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?sessionId=27590213&skin=h
udoc-en&action=html&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649
&key=44639&highlight=.
285. Tepe c. Turquie [Tepe v. Turkey], App. No. 17129/02, ¶ 6, Eur. Ct.
H.R.
(2008),
available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=842342
&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142B
F01C1166DEA398649 (translated by author).
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287. Kanat c. Turquie [Kanat v. Turkey], App. No. 13799/04, Eur. Ct.
H.R.
(2008),
available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=842380
&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142B
F01C1166DEA398649.
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argued that steps should be taken to improve the education of
women.289 The Court held that, standing alone, the fact that a
member of an illegal organization had made statements did not
justify the government‘s interference with the newspaper‘s
right to freedom of expression, since the statements did not
incite recourse to violence, armed resistance or insurrection.290
Moreover, the Court found that because the applicants‘
convictions had been disproportionate to the aims pursued,
their prosecutions were not ―necessary in a democratic
society.‖291
Taken as a whole, the ECtHR‘s recent jurisprudence does
not suggest that the Court has radically altered the shape of its
Article 10 reasoning process in the post-Framework era. The
Court‘s analysis continues to be bound by a common core of
basic principles. State interference on speech must be justified
by a pressing social need, as well as be both necessary and
proportionate. How the Court elects to apply those principles
to a particular case depends on its analysis of the unique facts
of each case. In some sense, the weakness in the Court‘s ability
to protect free speech stems from the Court‘s own weak
position: it can only guide state decision-making within the
rather wide boundaries set by the margin of the appreciation
doctrine. The weakness of the Court‘s position is underscored
by the ongoing number of petitions that the Court fields from
Turkish citizens. Despite the plethora of Court opinions that
fail to uphold Turkey‘s attempts to sanction speech, the Court‘s
decisions as a whole appear to have had little effect in
moderating Turkey‘s ongoing attempts to circumscribe speech
on the Kurdish question.
Moreover, the ECtHR possesses wide discretion to discern
that speech possesses the potential to incite violence. From an
American perspective, it appears that the Court strains to find
a potential link to possible violence. However, Europe‘s
commitment to the government‘s affirmative role in protecting
communitarian values and human dignity suggests a different
interpretation. Perhaps it would be more accurate to state that
the Court is extremely sensitive to the potential that speech

289. Id. ¶ 7.
290. Id. ¶ 19. See also Press Release, supra note 284.
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possesses to roil the community and to undermine human
dignity.
IV. Conclusion: Law, Terrorism, and the Changing Nature of
Democratic States
The attacks on London and Madrid rocked Europe. The
presence of ―home grown‖ terrorists led policymakers to take
aggressive steps to implement a prevention-oriented
counterterrorism policy, one focus of which was to interrupt the
radicalization process.
The Council of Europe‘s 2008
Amendment to the Framework Decision, which instructed
states to implement anti-incitement legislation, is evidence of
this shift.
One would expect that the enactment of this legislation
would signal a shift in how Member States balance the values
of protecting national security and preserving public order with
the right to freedom of expression. At first glance, the
reasoning behind such laws is understandable.
Having
recovered from the initial shock of damage caused by radical
Islamic terrorism, governments throughout Europe have
shifted counterterrorism strategies in the direction of
prevention. In order to stop terrorists before they cause
civilian casualties, law enforcement must interrupt attackplanning and recruitment. Some percentage of individuals who
hear the terrorists‘ messages will someday engage in violent
action.
However, the direction of the Framework Decision and
subsequent state legislation is problematic. In an effort to
broadly target speech that may lead to incitement, many states
have implemented legislation that does not require that the
link between speech and incitement be direct. In some states,
the individual responsible for the speech need not have actually
intended to incite violence. In these cases, this legislation has
awarded prosecutors and magistrates the power to criminally
sanction speech that has little chance of inciting violence.
Moreover, the legislation‘s efficacy in stopping recruitment is
questionable. The research cited in this article indicates that
there are many paths to becoming a terrorist. As a result, the
Framework Amendment has propelled states to waste scarce
legal and prosecutorial resources as they attempt to go after

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/17

64

2010]

FREE SPEECH . . . EUROPEAN SECURITY

481

speech, rather than action. Where governments use their newfound power to prosecute individuals already on the societal
periphery, they may do more harm than good. Publicity
generated by such prosecutions may destroy civic goodwill in
certain segments of the population who will view the cases
through a lens of political and religious persecution.
While magistrates and prosecutors appear to have
endorsed the anti-incitement and glorification legislation shift
by instigating investigations and prosecutions under these
provisions, that shift has been somewhat tempered by the
decisions of national courts. Still, the expanded scope of
government action, such as the use of anti-incitement
legislation to deport non-citizens in France, proceeds
unaffected by judicial review. Moreover, individuals caught in
the net of these provisions require time and resources to fight
back.
While some commentators have suggested that the ECtHR
has shifted direction in the past decade towards upholding
more state intrusions on speech, it is difficult to determine that
such a premise is true. The critical doctrinal features of the
Court‘s Article 10 jurisprudence, namely the requirement that
the restriction serve a pressing social need as well as be both
necessary and proportionate, were in place before the
Amendment‘s adoption. Moreover, the Court‘s jurisprudence in
effect merely sets the outer boundaries of that balance. Under
the margin of appreciation doctrine, states have the power to
fine tune the balance between security and free speech in
accord with their own unique legal and cultural histories.
When compared to the United States Supreme Court, the
ECtHR has far less power to set the boundaries of freedom of
expression. As Elisabeth Zoller has noted, while the Supreme
Court grants American states almost no margin of judgment,
the ECtHR lacks the same degree of control over European
states.292 There is no definitive European standard that
defines the scope of freedom of expression; instead a plethora of
national definitions exist. Those standards must fall within
the wide boundaries set by Strasbourg. With robust power, the
Supreme Court has rigorously defended freedom of expression

292. Elisabeth Zoller, Freedom of Expression: “Precious Right” in Europe,
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in the United States by imposing what Zoller has described as
―categorical and rigid rules.‖293
The history of free speech protections in Europe is far
different than the direction taken by the United States in the
past four decades.
There are wide variations in those
traditions throughout Europe. Until the passage of the Human
Rights Act of 1998, for example, England took little notice of
While the Act raised public
freedom of expression.294
consciousness as well as established the British court‘s
obligations to protect the freedom of expression, that
consciousness is also seared by the imprint of the London
bombings. More importantly, the high value that European
jurisprudence places on human dignity necessarily prevents
free speech from assuming a privileged constitutional position.
The barbarous actions taken by Germany‘s Nazi regime
spurred Europe‘s post-war governments to take aggressive
action targeting hate speech. These actions in many ways
paved the way for the current round of anti-incitement and
glorification of terrorism legislation.
Although the ECtHR has underscored the importance of
the free flow of information in a democratic society, the
preeminent role accorded to human dignity created a doctrinal
legacy that severely tempered that flow of information. The
high value that some European states place on promoting the
dignity of the community places limits on the content of civil
discourse that many Americans would be unwilling to tolerate.
Still, that same communitarianism may open the door to
government action in the name of counterterrorism policy that
may pose a threat to democratic governance.
The degree to which a society tolerates anti-democratic
speech may reflect the government‘s confidence in the health of
the democracy.
Governments throughout Europe are
confronting dilemmas posed by the increasing diversity of
Europe‘s population. States such as Germany, France, and the
United Kingdom are home to large unintegrated Muslim
communities, which challenge the notion of an integrated
national community itself.
As European states make
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judgements about what speech is acceptable in an age of terror,
lurking in the background is the question, acceptable to whom?
As courts make judgments about the potential that particular
speech has to incite violence, those determinations run the risk
of protecting the majority‘s vision and criminalizing the views
of minority populations. Viewed in this light, it is possible that
European states will use these new anti-incitement and
glorification provisions to censor certain political viewpoints in
an attempt to preserve traditional visions of homogenous
European states. By placing these powerful tools in the hands
of the state, legislatures and citizens run the risk that
prosecutors see the danger of terrorism everywhere and will
seek to over-broadly regulate speech and undermine
democratic discourse. In an era in which governments can so
easily manipulate each terrorist attack to stoke public fears
and justify the further aggrandizement of state power, the risk
that these statutes pose to democratic governance may be too
high given the fact that the efficacy of the provisions is
questionable.
While the emergence of home-grown terrorism on
European soil constitutes a real threat to European security,
Europe‘s recent steps further privilege security over speech.
Due to their overbreadth, they constitute an equally serious
threat to democratic governance. The steps that Europe has
taken to regulate speech lowers the burdens placed on
governments to justify those restrictions so drastically that
they raise the spectre that governments will use the
regulations to merely target speech that is offensive. The
constitutional struggle to find the proper balance between
endowing governments with sufficient power to protect citizens
and protecting civil liberties is an ongoing one that reflects a
political community‘s self-understanding.295 The contours of
those policies, particularly how they protect security and
human rights, define the foundations of the democratic state.
As Europe struggles to protect itself from terrorism, it is
equally important that Europe pay attention to the norms of
democratic debate itself.

295. Nolte, supra note 91, at 4.
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